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I. INTRODUCTION - THE INFERNO
Midway through life's journey and a few years hence, it came to
me to inquire of the state of those I had encountered sometime be-
fore in the wood of error before I had sought to ascend to the mount
of joy. At that time, I traveled the wood in the hope of aiding those
attacked by the offspring of two great beasts. In days past, three
beasts ruled the wood attacking and ravaging countless souls both
young and old. One beast, displayed many colors and had exceed-
ingly long claws with which it scarred and disfigured some and de-
stroyed others. Its teeth were exceedingly sharp and those suffering
its bite new pain and death. This beast was called Sexism. The sec-
ond beast was pale in color with a sweeping gate. It placed many
souls in fear and inspired great terror through its roar. Those who
opposed it and the entire wood knew its might and its power to de-
stroy. Through its teeth, it killed instantly and by practice it dis-
played the carcass of those it destroyed for all to see. Racism was
the title given to it. A third beast also prowled the wood and by its
great tail it swept its prey from their feet and trampled them under
foot; grinding their faces into the dirt with its immense hooves. This
third beast was the oldest of the beasts. It was arrayed with many
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colors and fat from the many souls it devoured. All knew it as Pov-
erty.
From time to time, cadres of warriors joined together to oppose
one or the other beasts and in my youth hunters of stout heart as-
sailed the second beast and drove it back to the shadows from
whence it still strikes. To prevail against this second beast these
great hunters fashioned special weapons that could wound the beast
and decrease its power. Though more fleet of foot and elusive, the
first beast also succumbed to an onslaught of hunters and yielded
territory it formerly controlled. Alas, because of its age and past
failures against it, many accepted the reign of the third beast saying
"this beast shall always be with us we can at best avoid it ourselves
and possibly aid its victims."
Unbeknownst to some, these three beasts yielded two offspring.
Though mighty like their predecessors, the offspring had small stat-
ure and narrow gaits. They left faint tracks that seemed as those of
the older beasts, so many doubted that offspring were sired. The
doubters claimed that the first beast with its many colors and long
claws fell upon the supposed victims of the offspring or that it was
the third beast that all should avoid who had attacked them. Yet, the
victims knew that offspring prowled the wood and that these crea-
tures daily devoured their kindred. The two offspring traveled to
together sometimes sharing prey. The larger of the offspring had
many colors, long claws, and a great tail. On either of its two heads
were written "sexism" and "poverty" and on its underbelly "envi-
ronmental destruction." Its sibling was pale in color with long claws
and sharp teeth. Like the larger creature it also had two heads. On
one head was written "racism" and on the other "sexism" and on its
underbelly "environmental destruction."
In days now past, I was called to join the hunt against this second
creature. Though I and my associates were few we were confident
that we could track this creature and cut back its territory. Armed
with two of the weapons that prevailed against the second beast, a
lance dubbed "Equal Protection" and a sword called "Title VI," I and
my colleagues rode the wood to respond to cries for aide. Sadly, we
didn't know that the creature we hunted was immune from the
weapons that had diminished the power of the second beast, but we
soon find out that neither "Equal Protection" nor "Title VI" stood
much hope against the creature its victims called "environmental
racism."
If you are a person who is squeamish about issues of race, perhaps
you should stop reading here. The remainder of this article talks
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specifically about the relationship between race law and environ-
mental protection. I recognize up front that in some minds this sub-
ject warrants less consideration and exploration as the cynical views
of a privileged law professor whining about the supposed but more
likely imagined injustices against racial minorities; a subject that is
uninteresting in the minds of many of our nation's racial majority. 1
Others' distaste for the subject matter may rest in its seeming irrele-
vance to the important subject of environmental protection that
places vast human and animal populations at risk through phenom-
ena like global climate change. Such readers may feel, as one of my
former students, that cries for environmental justice threaten all peo-
ple's well being by distracting us from the life and death issues fac-
ing the entire planet. If you fit either of these two descriptions you
should probably put down this article to save yourself time. On the
other hand, if you keep reading you may find, as Dante, that even a
distasteful journey may carry great benefits.2
Mounting environmental challenges command an ever increasing
prominence within American society. Unbeknownst to most Ameri-
cans, decision makers at all levels of government have routinely
formulated and implemented environmental decisions that affected
local communities, the nation, and the globe. For some communi-
ties, those decisions increased pollution exposure, health risks, road
hazards, odors, and blight while for other communities environ-
mental policies maintained or created greenways, walking trails,
convenient transportation options, and increased environmental qual-
ity. The difference between the decisions can sometimes be ex-
plained by race, other times by income, and frequently by a combi-
nation of the two.
This article explores the attempts to use civil rights law as a means
of addressing racial bias, perceived and otherwise, in environmental
decision making. Its primary contribution is its development and use
of an "environmental racism" rubric to explain why civil rights
based challenges to pollution permits and waste facility siting deci-
sions have uniformly failed in the federal courts. Pending congres-
sional legislation, the article concludes, offers little assistance to
community members concerned about the effects of additional pollu-
tion sources in their neighborhoods. If congress intends to aide
1. See JOE FEAGIN, RACIST AMERICA: ROOTS, CURRENT REALITIES, AND
FUTURE REPARATIONS (Routledge ed. 2001).
2. See DANTE ALIGHIERI, INFERNO: THE DIVINE COMEDY (Bantam Classics
ed., Bantam Dell 1982) (1314).
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communities facing racially discriminatory and adverse effects from
polluting facilities the article maintains that comprehensive legisla-
tive action is needed. At a minimum, the article contends, Congress
should legislatively overturn Alexander v. Sandoval in the environ-
mental context and allow private citizens to enforce EPA's Title VI
regulations. The article attempts this in five parts.
Part two provides historical background on the American race
problem. Through an examination of concerns raised by Dr. Martin
Luther King Jr. in 1967 that many forms of racial bias present in the
nation's cities remained unabated despite the promulgation of civil
rights legislation. The Kerner Commission echoed these concerns in
their now famous report issued in 1968. The special panel was
commissioned by President Lyndon Johnson the previous year to
determine the cause of racial unrest and urban rioting in America's
cities. Like Dr. King's remarks, the Commissions' findings reflect
and foreshadow the limited success of existing civil rights law to
address some of the nations' most basic racial ills.
Part three reviews federal cases that involved challenges to the en-
vironmental decisions of state and local officials. The courts in these
cases almost uniformly reject claims of racial discrimination under
the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution or Ti-
tle VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. By surveying the range of
cases and facts giving rise to claims, this part shows courts' denial of
"environmental racism" claims across an assortment of facts.
Part four of the article explains the failure of "environmental ra-
cism" claims in the courts. To accomplish this, the section shows
that the court's decisions in these cases cohere when viewed through
the veil of Democratic Process and Motive Review theory. This in-
sight finds additional support when considered in light of the "Perpe-
trator's Perspective" of antidiscrimination law and the ethnic compe-
tition model of racial disparity used by the Supreme Court in its ra-
cial discrimination jurisprudence. This section culminates with the
development of an environmental racism rubric that identifies the
characteristics of the environmental racism cases most likely to suc-
ceed and to fail.
In Part five, the article examines a recent follow up to the original
Kerner Report forty years after its issuance. The findings of signifi-
cant racial segregation in housing and education in American cities
are then related to the limitations of civil rights legislation identified
by Dr. King and the original Kemer Commission. The section in-
vestigates the society's and the courts' interest in addressing envi-
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ronmental injustices that merely reflect the de facto segregation ac-
cepted in housing and education.
Part six explores pending legislation on "environmental justice" in
the United States Congress and its potential for resolving communi-
ties concerns. The proposed legislation builds on Executive Order
12898, issued by President William Clinton, as a means to address
human and environmental inequities that result from federal pro-
grams, policies, or procedures.
The article concludes with recommendations for Congressional ac-
tion that addresses the challenges posed by the issue of "environ-
mental racism."
II. THROUGH THE GATES OF HELL
During the latter part of the Civil Rights Movement, the Southern
Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC) expanded their campaigns
beyond the borders of the Jim Crow South into the north and the
west.3 Chicago, Illinois stood as the focus of SCLC and Dr. King's
attention.4 In an effort to build on the successes gained against Jim
Crow segregation in the South and by the passage of civil rights leg-
islation proscribing discrimination in public accommodations, em-
ployment, and voting, civil rights workers hoped to end the dis-
crimination in housing and education faced by African-Americans
living on the Westside of Chicago. 5 At the end of the campaign,
King and the civil rights workers left Chicago with a real sense of
despair.6 Despite their significant investment of time and resources,
African Americans living on Chicago's Westside still faced de facto
3. See STEPHEN B. OATEs, LET THE TRUMPET SOUND: A LiFE OF MARTIN
LUTHER KING, JR. 376-79 (Harper Collins Publishers 1994) (1982).
4. See id. at 379-80.
5. See id. at387.
6. See id. at 417-18. A similar phenomenon had taken place a few years
before in Albany, GA. This campaign, which took place immediately before the
success of Birmingham, failed due to the courteous treatment and planning of the
white Police Chief Laurie Pritchett. Despite Pritchett's courteous treatment and
the absence of overt venom by his men that characterized so much of the South,
African-Americans in Albany still suffered daily from the effects of racist policies
and practices. Nonetheless, due to the lack of opprobrium and overt racial animus
displayed toward King and other civil rights workers, the campaign failed to en-
gender the same support from the justice department and the courts that SCLC
gained in other campaigns. Id. at 191-95.
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segregation in their schools and in housing. 7 Moreover, efforts by
King and others to address these problems received little sympathy
from whites. 8 In fact, polls of the time showed that "85 percent of
white Americans believed that Negroes were demanding too much,
going to far...,9 In fact, the Village of Arlington Heights case itself
took place in one of the Chicago's suburban neighborhoods marked
by de facto segregation. 10 The Court, however, like the power struc-
ture faced by King and others could find no fault with the North's
"neutral" public policies that resulted in the adversity faced by
blacks. 1  King recognized this toward the end of the Civil Rights
Movement and expressed his frustration with the intractable de facto
segregation experienced by the millions of blacks living outside of
the South. 12 He confessed that the successes of the first decade of
the movement misled everyone about the depth of anger suppressed
by northern blacks and "the amount of bigotry" that America's white
majority disguised. 13 "The white power structure is still seeking to
keep the walls of segregation and inequality substantially intact" he
explained in 1967, just a few short months before his death. 14
Earlier the same year, President Lyndon B. Johnson had estab-
lished a national Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders, popu-
larly known as the Kerner Commission. 15 In 1968, the Commission
provided its findings; as a result of its study the eleven member
group reached the conclusion that "Our nation is moving toward two
societies, one black, one white - separate and unequal."' 6 Further,
the report found the following:
7. See id
8. See id. at 418.
9. Id.
10. See id; see also Viii. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429
U.S. 252, 255 (1977) (During the 1960s, Arlington Heights experienced consider-
able growth, but the population of its racial minority groups remained low. In
1970, the population of the Village included 64,000 residents; however, only 27 of
the residents were black).
11. Id. at 270-71.
12. See DAVID GARROW, BEARING THE CROSS 581 (William Morrow & Co.,
Inc. 1986)
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. See NAT'L ADVISORY COMM'N ON CIVIL DISORDERS, SUMMARY OF
REPORT, REPORT OF THE NATIONAL ADVISORY COMM'N ON CIVIL DISORDERS 609
(Bantam Books 1968), available at http://www.eisenhowerfoundation.org/
docs/Kemer.pdf.
16. Id.
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Segregation and poverty have created in the racial ghetto
a destructive environment totally unknown to most white
Americans. What white Americans have never fully un-
derstood-but what the Negro can never forget-is that
white society is deeply implicated in the ghetto. White
institutions created it, white institutions maintain it, and
white society condones it. 
17
Like the Commission, King believed that racism caused the urban
unrest of the time. 18 In light of those realities, King realized that the
desegregation campaigns in the South and the legal victories that
accompanied them were limited achievements in light of the prob-
lems facing millions of blacks in America's cities.' 9 Today, envi-
ronmental justice activists and others face the same battle against
apathy and facially neutral policies that relegate African-Americans
and other racial minorities to bear disproportionate pollution burdens
with the acceptance of federal and state law officials. This struggle
began when claims of "environmental racism" surfaced in the 1970s.
Environmental Justice Background
The environmental justice movement began as a continuation of
the civil rights movement, and focused on the prevalence of racism
in the environmental arena. Its national prominence can be traced to
Warren County, North Carolina, which under the leadership of Con-
gressman Walter Fauntleroy mirrored the "campaigns" of the civil
rights movement. Organizers fighting against the placement of a
hazardous waste landfill in the area protested and used civil disobe-
dience to challenge what they understood was "environmental ra-
cism. ' 21 After a truck driver traversed the state from the northern to
the southern border and back again discharging waste oils along the
shoulders of Interstate Highway 85, state officials decided to place a
toxic waste landfill in Warren County to hold the contaminated soils
17. Id.
18. See infra note 161, at 600, 609.
19. See id. at 581.
20. Walter Fauntleroy, the non-voting delegate to the United States House of
Representatives for the District of Columbia, was a former civil rights organizer
and lieutenant of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.
21. ROBERT BULLARD, DUMPING IN DIXIE: RACE, CLASS, AND ENVTL.
QUALITY 31 (Westview Press 2000).
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22gathered from across the state. Protestors challenged the action as
racism because the site selected was in the county with the largest
black population of the state near a black residential area. 23 Con-
gressman Fauntleroy was arrested along with 500 others during the
protest. Upon his return to Washington he requested a General Ac-
counting Office (GAO) study examining the demographics of com-
munities with hazardous waste sites in the southeast.
24
The 1985 GAO study found that three out of five hazardous waste
landfills in the southeast region were located in predominantly black
or Latino areas. It was soon followed by a 1987 report, entitled
"Toxic Waste and Race" by the Commission for Racial Justice of the
United Church of Christ. 2 6 That report was more extensive than the
GAO study.27 It looked at the list of uncontrolled toxic waste sites
contained in the Environmental Protection Agency Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Information
System (CERCLIS) database and mapped them unto zip codes
across the country. Using census data, the study then correlated
the zip codes with waste sites and the demographic data for nearby
residents. 29 Beyond analyzing the racial makeup of residents, the
study also examined residential income to assess its relative signifi-
cance in the location of waste sites. 30 Report author, Charles Lee,
and others, reported in the study that regardless of their income Afri-
can-Americans disproportionately lived in zip codes with uncon-
22. See id. at 30. Over 30,000 gallons of PCB-laced oil was dumped and left
on the side of over 210 miles of road in North Carolina for four years before the
state and the EPA began clean up efforts. Id.
23. See id. Warren County was more than 84% black at the time. Id.
24. See U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE (GAO), SITING OF HAZARDOUS
WASTE LANDFILLS AND THEIR CORRELATION WITH RACIAL AND ECONOMIC
STATUS OF SURROUNDING CMTYS. (June 1, 1983), available at
http://archive.gao.gov/d48t l3/121648.pdf (last visited Feb. 27, 2009).
25. See id.
26. CHARLES LEE, COMM'N FOR RACIAL JUSTICE, TOXIC WASTES AND RACE IN
THE U.S.: A NAT'L REPORT ON THE RACIAL AND SOCIOECONOMIC
CHARACTERISTICS OF CMTYS. WITH HAZARDOUS WASTES SITES (United Church of
Christ 1987).
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. See id.
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trolled toxic waste sites. 31  Within a year, a book by sociologist
Robert Bullard of the Clark Atlanta University in Atlanta, Georgia,
entitled "Dumping in Dixie" provided an academic examination of a
historic and continuing phenomenon that relegated many undesirable
waste disposal and polluting facilities to predominantly black areas.
With the GAO study, Commission for Racial Justice report, and Pro-
fessor Bullard's book bolstering their claims, local activists and
more prominent civil rights leaders began to draw attention to racial
disparities in the siting of pollution related facilities. 32 In response
to growing awareness and pressure, in 1990, Environmental Protec-
tion Agency (hereinafter "EPA") Administrator William Reilly,
commissioned an agency task force to determine what relationship
existed between race and pollution.33 Rejecting the activists' claims
that EPA and others participated in environmental racism; the Ad-
ministrator adopted the name "Environmental Equity" to describe
the concerns raised by activists. 34
Because the southeast region represented a focal point of environ-
mental racism claims, the EPA's Region Four office in Atlanta be-
came a major battlefield in the controversy. When the EPA's Draft
Environmental Equity report was issued in 1992, the author had been
an attorney in the EPA Region Four Office of Regional Counsel for
less than one year. Coinciding with the issuance of the report, re-
gional personnel and local organizers convened a meeting of activ-
ists from across the region to come and discuss their concerns with
EPA personnel. 35 At the well-attended meeting, one of the concerns
raised was the EPA's decision to study "environmental equity" in-
stead of "environmental racism."
36
Though couched in semantic terms, this disagreement reflected a
fundamental difference in the understanding that they and the EPA
31. See id. Charles Lee currently serves as the deputy director of the EPA's
Office of Envtl. Justice and chair of the EPA's National Envtl. Justice Advisory
Council.
32. See Lee, supra note 26.
33. See U.S. ENvTL. PROT. AGENCY [hereinafter EPA], ENVTL. EQUITY:
REDUCING RISKS FOR ALL CMTYS. (June, 1992), available at
http://www.epa.gov/compliance/resources/publications/ej/reducingriskcomvol
1 .pdf (last visited Feb. 27, 2009).
34. See id.
35. See Press Release, EPA, Release of Envtl. Equity Report (July 22, 1992)
available at http://www.epa.gov/history/topics/justice/Ol.htm (last visited Feb. 27,
2009).
36. Id.
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had over the issue. Activists felt that race affected the decisions of
corporations and state officials in choosing sites for unwanted pollu-
tion. Though activists lacked direct evidence of racial animus, they
believed that the disparity in siting shown by the preceding studies
and their own experience confirmed the phenomenon. On the other
hand, the EPA's position reflected the view that racism was a
charged word and that the behavior of their grant recipients, person-
nel, and others should not be so described absent clear evidence to
that effect. The disagreement escalated when the director of the
Commission for Racial Justice, Benjamin Chavis Jr., popularized the
phrase "environmental racism." 37 The issue continued to play out in
the following three new contexts: studies contesting racial disparity
in siting, federal court cases brought under the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and Title VI of the Civil
Rights Act, and administrative complaints filed with the EPA alleg-
ing Title VI violations by EPA grant recipients. 38 Nonetheless, both
the EPA and activists accepted "Environmental Justice" to describe
their concern and the apparent disagreement faded. 39
The EPA created an Office of Environmental Justice in the agency
Administrator's Office. It was tasked with investigating the issue
and educating agency personnel on how to approach citizens' con-
cerns. The first director, Clarice Gaylord, had a Ph.D. in atmos-
pheric science and brought a scientific perspective and background
to the issue. She was assisted in the task with corresponding re-
gional directors. In Region Four, where a substantial number of
"environmental justice" hot spots existed, Vivian Malone Jones was
hired to direct the office. 40 A love-hate relationship soon developed
37. Rachel D. Godsil, Remedying Envtl. Racism, 90 MICH. L. REv. 394, 395
(1991) (Chavis using the term "environmental racism" to refer to both the inten-
tional and the unintentional disproportionate imposition of environmental hazards
on minorities). The EPA uses the term "environmental justice" to refer to the fair
treatment of all people, no matter what their race, color, national origin, or income
level, in the development, implementation, and enforcement of environmental
laws, regulations, and policies. See Tom Stephens, An Overview of Envtl. Justice,
20 T.M. COOLEY L. REv. 229,231 (2003).
38. See infra Part II.
39. See Stephens, supra note 37, at 231.
40. Unlike Dr. Gaylord, Ms. Jones' background was in civil rights. Best
known for integrating the University of Alabama despite George Wallace's per-
sonal refusal to deny her entrance to the University, Ms. Jones provided the
agency with a level of credibility in dealing with a new breed of environmental
activists. Now deceased, Ms. Jones served as director from 1992 to 1996. During
this time, the author served as the primary contact and support for the Regional
[VOL. XX
2009] ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE AND EQUAL PROTECTION 61
as William Clinton was elected President of the United States, and
the EPA announced that "environmental justice" was one of its top
five priorities.41  The EPA soon became the agency that environ-
mental justice activists loved to hate. Serving as a clearinghouse for
activists to voice their concerns, the EPA modified many of its poli-
cies and practices of community relations and took substantial
strides to give voice to the concerns raised by "EJ communities."
The agency provided numerous grants, sponsored several confer-
ences and created a National Environmental Justice Advisory Coun-
cil (NEJAC) to inform the agency on ways to achieve its environ-
mental justice goals.42
One of the greatest benefits of these developments was the raised
awareness gained by Native American, African-American, Latino,
and other community members near Superfund sites and other pollu-
tion related facilities. During this time period, communities began to
share stories, ideas, and knowledge to assist each other in learning
about the risks they faced and the tools to decrease or eliminate
them. In 1994, President William Clinton supported these develop-
ments across the federal government by issuing Executive Order
12898, directing federal agencies to identify and address dispropor-
tionately high and adverse human health effects affecting minority
and low income populations.43
Under this regime, environmental justice became an exercise in
community relations for the EPA, state agencies, and corporations.44
Office of Envtl. Justice and the lead attorney addressing "environmental justice"
issues for the Region.
41. See Carol M. Browner, Adm'r of the EPA, Statement Before the U.S. Sen-
ate Comm. on Finance, 106th Cong. (Jan. 28, 1999), available at
http://www.epa.gov/ocir/hearings/testimony/106_ 1999_2000/012899cb.htm.
42. See EILEEN P. GAUNA & CLIFFORD RECHTSCHAFFEN, ENVTL. JUSTICE:
LAW, POLICY AND REGULATION (Carolina Academic Press 2002) (describing the
history of National Envtl. Justice Advisory Council.).
43. See Meredith J. Bowers, The Executive's Response to Envtl. Injustice:
Executive Order 12,898 1 ENvTL. LAW. 645 (Feb., 1995).
44. In the absence of either legislation or case law supporting reform in the
legal and regulatory regime governing the vast majority of environmental deci-
sions, Executive Order 12898 provided enough authority to raise public expecta-
tions but not to raise the level of environmental protection for minority communi-
ties. In fact, to date the EPA has never implemented the primary directive of the
Executive Order to "identify and address the disproportionately high and adverse
human health effects of its programs and procedures on low income and minority
populations." A 2004 EPA IG report concludes that the EPA "has not developed a
clear vision or a comprehensive strategic plan, and has not established values,
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Rather than the development of an environmental policy that at-
tended to the alleged disparity in pollution exposure, the environ-
mental justice movement raised the awareness of community mem-
bers concerning their role in environmental decision-making and
forced agency officials to develop a more effective means of dealing
with the concerns of "minority" and "low income" populations. This
represented a genuine improvement over the status quo. In fact, at
the local level the environmental justice movement has provided
well organized communities with access to funds, education, re-
sources and great deal more respect and consideration from public
officials and corporations.45 Unfortunately, the fundamental discord
remained and today represents the primary basis of federal courts' all
but unanimous rejection of environmental justice claims under both
the Fourteenth Amendment and Title VI. Moreover, the EPA's
failure to find a single Title VI violation by any of its grant recipi-
ents since its 1997 decision to dedicate staff and resources to inves-
tigating Title VI complaints flows from the same discord.
However, while environmental justice was gaining notoriety and
recognition through the 1980s and early 1990s, a different movement
was transpiring in the federal courts. President Reagan's appoint-
ment of Justices Antonin Scalia and Sandra Day O'Connor to the
goals, expectations, and performance measurements" to meet the directive. See
EPA OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL [OIG], EVALUATION REPORT: EPA NEEDS
TO CONSISTENTLY IMPLEMENT THE INTENT OF THE EXECUTIVE ORDER ON ENVTL.
JUSTICE, Report No. 2004-P-00007 (Mar. 1, 2004), available at
http://www.epa.gov/oig/reports/2004/20O40301-2004-P-00007.pdf; A 2006 Report
finds that the Agency has also failed to conduct Environmental Justice reviews of
its programs as required by the Executive Order. EPA-OIG, EVALUATION REPORT:
EPA NEEDS TO CONDUCT ENVTL. JUSTICE REVIEWS OF ITS PROGRAMS, POLICIES
AND ACTIVITIES (R. 21.8.5), Report No. 2006-P-00034 (Sept. 18, 2006), available
at http://www.epa.gov/oig/reports/2006/20060918-2006-P-00034.pdf.
45. The evacuation of residents located near the "Mount Dioxin" Superfund
site in Pensacola, Florida, is a good example. See Sandra L. Geiger, An Alterna-
tive Legal Tool for Pursuing Envtl. Justice: The Takings Clause, 31 COLUM. J.L.
& SOC. PROBS. 201, 221 (1998). In 1991, the EPA began what would become a
five year evaluation process to assess whether an abandoned wood-treating facility
posed a significant enough hazard to relocate the predominantly black families
living in the area. See id. In light of evidence linking the residents' health prob-
lems to exposure to dioxin, arsenic and other chemicals from the facility, the EPA
determined that it would be more cost effective to permanently relocate the resi-
dents. See id. The federal government gave each family cash for their home (cal-
culated using the fair market value) and relocation costs. See id. This relocation
program helped to expand the option for people who would normally not have the
resources to leave. See id.
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bench, Clarence Thomas to head the Equal Employment and Oppor-
tunity Commission, and a slew of federal court judges who were
openly hostile to race based civil rights claims signaled the end of
the expansion of civil rights coverage for racial minorities that began
in the mid 1960s and the onset of a contraction of race based oppor-
tunities. 46 During this period, the federal courts, under the leader-
ship of the Supreme Court, consistently erected greater burdens on
parties seeking to remedy racial discrimination. Moreover, the U.S.
Department of Justice, under Attorney General Edwin Meese, had so
changed its position on race based discrimination that it switched
sides in prominent cases to oppose its former position. 47 Accord-
ingly, the expansion of civil rights protection to racial minorities in
the environmental context had little hope of finding succor in the
federal courts.48
III. DOWN INTO THE ABYSS - CIVIL RIGHTS CASES AND
ENVIRONMENTAL DECISIONS
A. The Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause Cases
Despite the ongoing contraction of race based civil rights claims
and remedies in the federal courts during the 1980s, early activists
and others increasingly brought suits claiming violations of the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 49 These
suits alleged that state agencies sited waste facilities in predomi-
nantly black and Latino areas and that racial disparity and inequality
46. See KIMBERLE WILLIAMS CRENSHAW, Demarginalizing the Intersection of
Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique ofAntidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist
Theory and Antiracist Politics, in FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY: READINGS IN LAW
AND GENDER 57-80 (Katherine Bartlett and Rose Kennedy eds., Westview Press
1991).
47. See William A. Wines, Title VII Interpretation and Enforcement in the
Reagan Years (1980-89): The Winding Road to the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 77
MARQ. L. REV. 645,673 (1995).
48. See generally Suzanne Smith, Current Treatment of Envtl. Justice Claims:
Plaintiffs Face a Dead End in the Courtroom, 12 B. U. PUB. INT. L. J. 223 (2002).
49. The Fourteenth Amendment states in relevant part that "[n]o State shall...
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S.
CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
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were characteristic of environmental decision-making. 50  These
claims were uniformly unsuccessful; yet, some consideration of the
handful of cases will help demonstrate the substance of my claim
that federal courts will not recognize "environmental racism" claims
under the Fourteenth Amendment absent a strong showing of the
type of "racial animus" typically associated with the actions of Bull
Connor and other white segregationists. 51
In Bean v. Southwestern Waste Management Corporation, plain-
tiffs alleged that the Texas Department of Health's (TDH) issuance
of a permit continued a historical pattern and practice of dispropor-
tionately siting waste facilities in and around African American
neighborhoods.52  As evidence, plaintiffs identified the racial
makeup of the areas proximate to both the proposed and the existing
waste facilities.53 The evidence provided by the plaintiffs included
sites permitted by the Texas Department of Water Resources
(TDWR) and the TDH. 54 However, the plaintiffs' concerns accord-
ingly stemmed from the data showing the disparity in facility loca-
tions affecting nearby African Americans. 5  Under the court's
analysis, the relevant facilities only related to the actions of the TDH
because they could only be responsible for their own actions. 56 Af-
ter removing the TDWR sites from the data set, the court found that
no statistically significant disparity existed in the location of waste
sites.5 7 The court further broke down the plaintiffs' claim by reject-
ing their method of analyzing the alleged disparate impact.5 While
the plaintiffs focused on the racial makeup of communities and parts
of town, the court looked to census tracts to define the relevant sta-
tistical data.59 The court rejected the plaintiffs' request for a pre-
50. Donna Gareis-Smith, Envtl. Racism: The Failure of Equal Prot. to Pro-
vide a Judicial Remedy and the Potential of Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act,
13 TEMP. ENvTL. L. & TECH. J. 57, 65-70 (1994).
5 1. See infra Part IV.
52. Bean v. Sw. Waste Mgmt. Corp., 482 F. Supp. 673, 677-79 (Tex. 1979).
This case launched the career of Robert Bullard, the leading scholar in the envi-
ronmental justice field and the director of the Clark Atlanta Univ. Envtl. Justice
Resource Center.
53. Id. at 677-79.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 679.
58. Id.
59. Id; see also infra Part III for a discussion of analytical methods.
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liminary injunction to stop the location of the new landfill across
from a predominantly black high school in the black residential area
of Northwood Manor in Houston ruling plaintiffs were unlikely to
succeed on the merits.
60
This case and its outcome underscores one of the many problems
faced by environmental justice litigants. Rather than examining how
current and past governmental decisions collectively create adverse
disparate impacts on minority populations, contemporary equal pro-
tection jurisprudence focuses on the motivation of a single entity to
assess whether a constitutional violation took place. 61 Following the
racial discrimination analysis proffered by the Supreme Court in the
Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development
Corporation, courts seek to uncover some hidden impermissible mo-
tive. 62 Environmental justice claimants, however, focus on the re-
sults of government decisions that disproportionately burden them. 63
As in Bean above, litigants' concerns flow from the outcome of nu-
merous decisions that now adversely affect them. 64 In their views,
race played an impermissible role in the outcome of numerous deci-
sions that reflect a lower standard of care and protection afforded
them. 65 While courts may find these alleged injustices unfortunate,
they do not view them as rising to the level of an impermissible gov-
ernment action. 66 Accordingly, claimants have had little hope of
prevailing under civil rights based laws. Novel interpretations of
existing civil rights statutes provide no better chances for litigants
because their legal theories represent fundamental disagreements
about the purpose and function of civil rights law.
67
60. ROBERT D. BULLARD, UNEQUAL PROT.: ENvTL. JUSTICE AND CMTYS. OF
COLOR 4 (Random House, Inc. 1997).
61. Bean, 482 F. Supp. at 673.
62. Viii. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252
(1977). Strangely, in the thirty years since its adoption the Court has rarely found
racial discrimination using the analysis, including the case in which it was devel-
oped. In practice, the test legitimates suspect decisions by making disparity analy-
sis a less significant part of the equal protection analysis. Id. at 266.
63. Consider the Warren County protests, and the studies by the GAO and the
UCC Commission on Racial Justice, pointing out disparities in the location of
hazardous and toxic waste.
64. Bean, 482 F. Supp. at 673, 677-79.
65. LUKE COLE & SHEILA FOSTER, FROM THE GROUND UP: ENVTL. RACISM
AND THE RISE OF THE ENVTL. JUSTICE MOVEMENT 70-74 (NYU Press 2000).
66. Bean, 482 F. Supp. at 679.
67. See infra Part III.
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The foregoing decision demonstrates the way equal protection
analysis has often been interpreted by the courts.6 8 Unlike statutory
interpretation, equal protection analysis flows almost exclusively
from the standards imposed by the federal courts. Accordingly, de-
spite the provision, injustices to blacks and other racial minorities
passed legal scrutiny like in the form of prohibitions on interracial
marriage, integrated schools, integrated railway cars, and other Jim
Crow laws. 69 The Courts' subsequent decisions to the contrary in
the wake of Brown v. Board of Education flowed from the changed
racial sensibility of the nation rather than any substantive legal ne-
cessity. 70 In this regard, blacks and other racial minorities have his-
torically had to wait for white sensibilities to change in order for
them to enjoy many legal protections today taken for granted.7' In
light of such a contingent jurisprudential history, claimants should
not view equal protection jurisprudence as fixed or preordained but
as a reflection of the contemporary norms of the society. 72 Accord-
ingly, environmental justice claimants should make note of the con-
temporary societal bias against race based antidiscrimination law
when evidence of racial animus is absent.73 The series of federal
cases examined below each analyzed environmental decisions for
possible violations of the Equal Protection Clause.
I next consider East Bibb Twiggs Neighborhood Association v.
Macon-Bibb County Planning & Zoning Commission.74 In this case,
the court reviewed the actions of a local zoning commission that ap-
proved the placement of an additional waste facility in a predomi-
nantly black community. 75 Plaintiffs contended that a historic prac-
tice existed of placing unwanted land uses in black communities. 76
Specifically, plaintiffs challenged the placement of a landfill in a
68. See Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252
(1977).
69. See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
70. Derrick A. Bell, Brown v. Board of Ed. and the Interest-Convergence Di-
lemma, 93 HARV. L. REV. 518, 521 (1980).
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. See infra Part Il.
74. E. Bibb Twiggs Neighborhood Ass'n v. Macon-Bibb County Planning &
Zoning Comm'n, 706 F. Supp. 880 (M.D. Ga. 1989), ajfd., 896 F.2d 1264 (1 1th
Cir. 1989).
75. Id.
76. Id
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majority black census tract.77 Despite the disparate impact allega-
tions of plaintiffs, the court's analysis reflected a primary concern
with the intentions of the board in approving the most recent permit
to ascertain if impermissible conduct took place. 78 As in Bean, the
court in East Bibb followed the equal protection analysis established
by the Supreme Court in Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Devel-
opment Corp.
7 9
Recognizing that the placement of the landfill in a predominantly
black census tract would necessarily have a disparate impact, the
court countered that the placement of a previous landfill in a pre-
dominantly white census tract nearby mitigated claims of racial bias
in the Commission's decision.8 0  The adjoining census tract was
much smaller with a majority white population; however, both tracts
were located in a 70% majority black voting district." The court
also kept its analysis limited to facilities approved by the commis-
sion, just as the district court had in Bean. Looking at the specific
census tract of the existing facility without regard for the census
tracts relationship to the larger community and area around it, the
court found that no racial bias was associated with the new facility
despite its placement in the predominantly black voting district with
other unwanted facilities. 83 If the Bean and East Bibb cases appear
to turn on the plaintiffs failure to persuade the court that a signifi-
cant enough disparity exists to constitute an equal protection viola-
tion under Arlington Heights, the following decision will show that
the significance of the disparity has not been determinative in envi-
ronmental justice cases. 84
R.I.S.E. v. Kay, Inc., provides one of the best examples of the futile
nature of past environmental justice equal protection litigation. 85 In
that case, plaintiffs alleged that the proposed facility was the fourth
placed in an almost exclusively black area, and that the sole facility
placed in a predominantly white area was closed due to the lowered
77. Id. at 881.
78. Id. at 884.
79. Viii. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252
(1977).
80. E. Bibb Twiggs Neighborhood Ass 'n, 706 F. Supp. at 880-84.
81. Id. at885.
82. Id. See also Bean v. Sw. Waste Mgmt. Corp., 482 F. Supp. 673, 673-79
(Tex. 1979).
83. E. Bibb Twiggs Neighborhood Ass 'n, 706 F. Supp. at 880-84.
84. R.I.S.E. v. Kay, Inc., 786 F. Supp. 1144 (E.D. Va. 1991).
85. Id.
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property values and the negative environmental affects that the facil-
ity would cause. 86 Although the court stipulated to the clear dispa-
rate impact of the decisions, it meticulously noted that the members
of the Board of Supervisors making the decision about the current
facility were not part of the Board when the first two facilities were
located.87 Although the court made no later reference to this fact, it
did decide that the plaintiffs failed to provide the necessary evidence
showing discriminatory purpose under Arlington Heights. 8 Instead,
the court explained that the Board members based their decision on
their concern for the economic plight of the entire county. 89 More-
over, the court made clear that "[T]he Equal Protection Clause does
not impose an affirmative duty to equalize the impact of official de-
cisions on different racial groups. Rather, it merely prohibits gov-
ernment officials from intentionally discriminating on the basis of
race."
90
Although the court here seems to have given short shrift to Arling-
ton Heights, finding that the current disparity and historic discrimi-
nation were not enough to infer a discriminatory purpose and dis-
counting evidence showing deviations from the standard decision-
making process, this case best reflects what environmental justice
litigants' chances to succeed have been under an equal protection
based analysis. 91 Despite the Court's claim in Arlington Heights
that direct evidence of racial animus need not be provided to show
discriminatory purpose in the absence of racial classifications, the
opposite has proven true. 92 Absent evidence of racial animus, con-
temporary federal courts rarely invalidate government decisions
based on the consideration of multiple factors to establish an equal
86. Id. at 1148-49.
87. The court found that two members of the current board participated in
approving the third facility suggesting the limited significance of past board deci-
sions in light of the changes in membership. Id. at 1148.
88. Id. at 1149-50.
89. Id. at 1150.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 1149-50.
92. Viii. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266
(1977); see also Robert Nelson, To Infer or Not to Infer a Discriminatory Pur-
pose: Rethinking Equal Prot. Doctrine, 61 N.Y.U. L. REv. 334, 341-42 (1986)
(citing recent cases which have ignored the Arlington Heights rule, instead requir-
ing a showing of discriminatory intent or direct evidence of racial animus as an
absolute prerequisite to an equal protection claim).
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protection violation. 93 In fact, a string of decisions show the un-
stated but implicit contemporary presumption that in the absence of
explicit racial classifications or a direct link to past de jure segrega-
tion patterns, governments act without discriminatory purpose when
substantial evidence to the contrary is lacking.94 This presumption
can create an insurmountable hurdle for environmental justice liti-
gants who routinely lack direct evidence of racial animus. 95 Envi-
ronmental justice and other litigants seeking to surmount the mount
of joy may find themselves trapped in a legal hell occupied by the
spirits of past litigants who hoped for racial justice.96
B. Cases Under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
In contrast to the cases above, the court in Dowdell v. City of
Apopka considered whether the disparity in funding municipal ser-
vices such as water distribution, sewerage facilities, and storm water
drainage to black and white residents by the City of Apopka consti-
tuted a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment and Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 9' Making
93. In R.I.S.E., direct evidence of racial animus may not have been enough as
plaintiff's appellate brief alleged that racially derogatory terms were used by both
a board member and a county official regarding the matter. Robert Collin, Envtl.
Equity: A Law and Planning Approach to Envtl. Racism, 11 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 495,
532 (1992); see also Michael Selmi, Proving Intentional Discrimination: The
Reality of Supreme Court Rhetoric, 86 GEO. L.J. 279, 284-85 (1997).
94. Such cases using the Arlington Heights analysis include the following:
Atkins v. Robinson, 545 F. Supp. 852 (D.C. Va. 1982); Laramore v. Ill. Sports
Facilities Auth., No. 89 C 1067, 1996 WL 153672 (N.D. Ill. 1996); U.S. v.
Charleston County, 316 F. Supp. 2d 268 (S.C. 2003).
95. Luke W. Cole, Civil Rights, Envtl. Justice, and the EPA: The Brief History
of Administrative Complaints Under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 9 J.
ENVWL. L. & LITIG. 309 (1994). Although litigants in Wash. Park Lead Comm.,
Inc. v. US. E.P.A. were able to withstand a summary judgment motion when they
alleged that a relocation decision perpetuated historic discrimination of a formerly
segregated housing project, the claim was voluntarily dismissed on appeal. No.
2:98CV421, 1998 WL 1053712 (E.D. Va. Dec. 1, 1998). For a contrary decision
consider, Broward Gardens Tenants Ass'n v. U.S. E.P.A., 311 F.3d 1066 C.A.1 1
(Fla. 2002). In Broward Gardens Tenants Ass'n, the court held that alleged viola-
tions of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment did not cir-
cumvent the ban on pre-enforcement review under the Comprehensive Envtl. Re-
sponse Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA). 311 F.3d at 1066.
96. For a contrary view, see Alice Kaswan, Envtl. Laws: Grist for the Equal
Prot. Mill, 70 U. COL. L. REv. 387,456 (1999).
97. Dowdell v. City of Apopka, 698 F.2d 1181, 1181-82 (Fla. 1983).
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much of the racial disparity in the level of services available to resi-
dents, the court connected the city's disparate funding decisions with
the municipal ordinance mandating residential segregation prior to
1968.98 The court went on to note that the city's awareness that its
predominant funding of services for white neighborhoods would not
only result in a lack of services for black residents, but constituted
relevant evidence of discriminatory purpose.
99
I begin my examination of Title VI with a brief survey of Dowdell
as a case between the margins that also included an equal protection
analysis. Unlike the previous cases concerned with the allocation of
environmental permits and sites, this case related to the provision of
municipal services to plaintiffs.' 00 Using the Arlington Heights
analysis, the court in this case nonetheless found violations of the
Equal Protection Clause. 1' Rather than a broad exception to the
rule against finding equal protection violations in the absence of di-
rect evidence, this case represents a strand of cases finding equal
protection violations when municipalities continue historic patterns
of discriminatory service provision. 102 In these cases, courts connect
the invidious purpose of historic de jure segregation with the con-
temporary denial of services, relating current patterns to past dis-
criminatory ordinances.I°3 Because environmental decision making
falls outside the arena of conduct historically associated with dis-
criminatory behavior, cases alleging purposive discrimination in that
98. Id. at 1184.
99. Id. at 1185-86. EPA attorney, Steadman Southall participated in early
efforts to resolve the dispute before the Dowdell decision. In discussions with the
author held in 1997 in Region Four, Southall noted the city used EPA funding to
develop its sewage treatment system and, that upon receipt of the grant, the city
committed to use the funds in a non-discriminatory fashion. Nonetheless, he
pointed out that the city's disparate funding practice took place despite his and
others' efforts to encourage them to fulfill their non-discrimination obligations as
an EPA grant recipient.
100. Dowdell, 698 F.2d. at 1181.
101. Id. at 1186.
102. Neighborhood Action Coal. v. City of Canton, Ohio, 882 F.2d 1012 (6th
Cir. 1989); Baker v. City of Kissimmee, 645 F. Supp. 571 (M.D. Fla. 1986); Am-
mons v. Dade City, Fla., 783 F.2d 982 (11 th Cir. 1986); Tinsley v. Kemp, 750 F.
Supp. 1001 (W.D. Mo. 1990); Midwest Comty. Council, Inc. v. Chicago Park
Dist., 98 F.R.D. 491 (N.D. I11. 1983).
103. Dowdell, 698 F.2d. at 1181. See infra Part III below for consideration of
why these cases of the 1970s and 1980s fit the definition of impermissible dis-
crimination.
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process failed to find traction in the federal courts. 104  In light of
that difficulty, many claimants hoped to find relief under Title VI of
the Civil Rights of 1964 using a discriminatory effects standard of
proof found in the EPA's Title VI regulations. 0 5 This hope led
some claimants down, what proved to be, an equally futile judicial
tract.
In Chester v. Seif, residents of Chester, Pennsylvania, complained
that the Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Quality violated
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 through the process it used
to grant a waste facility permit to Soil Remediation Services, Inc.
10 6
At the time of trial, Delaware County, Pennsylvania had a population
that was 86.5% white and 11.2% black. 10 7 Within Delaware County,
plaintiffs noted that the Chester Township had a population of 5,399,
of which 53.6% were black and 45% were white, and that the City of
Chester, had a population of 41,856, 65.2% of which were black and
33.5% of which were white.' 08 Residents and activists complained
that defendants' issuance of five waste facility permits in less than
ten years, which increased the permitted waste capacity in Chester
by over 2,000,000 tons per year had a discriminatory effect on the
predominantly black residents of the city of Chester.109 Plaintiffs
noted that the increased waste capacity did not include the permit
capacity of a sewage waste facility to treat 44,000,000 gallons of
sewage and incinerate 17,500 tons per year of sewage sludge.
1 0
The plaintiffs contrasted this permitting pattern within Chester with
the two waste facility permits granted outside of Chester during the
same period."' These two permits were located in two predomi-
nately white census tracts with a capacity of 700 tons per year.112
Plaintiffs claimed that, "only two Census Tracts in all of Delaware
County contained more than one waste facility and both of these
were located in areas with populations that were predominately Afri-
can-American.'" 3  In contrast, plaintiffs asserted that Delaware
104. See supra Part II.
105. See 40 C.F.R § 7 (1998).
106. Chester Residents Concerned for Quality Living v. Seif, 944 F. Supp. 413,
414 (E.D. Pa. 1996).
107. Id. at 414.
108. Id. at 413, n.1.
109. Id. at415.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 415-16.
112. Id. at415.
113. Id.
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County had 112 census tracts where white residents made up more
than 50% of the population; 8 of those had one facility and 104 had
none. 114
Further, the court acknowledged that the City of Chester has one of
the highest concentrations of industrial facilities in the state; it holds
numerous plants, it incinerates all the solid waste from Delaware
County, and 85% of Delaware County's raw sewage and sludge gets
treated there. 11' In Chester, many of the pollution sources are near
minority residential neighborhoods." 6 Within 100 feet of over 200
homes, a cluster of waste treatment facilities received permits for
operation. 117
At the district court level, the judge considered the claimants' evi-
dence but granted a motion to dismiss because the complaint failed
to allege intentional discrimination."18 Citing the Supreme Court's
decisions in Alexander v. Choate119 and Guardians Ass'n v. Civ.
Serv. Comm'n of City of N.Y., 120 the court maintained that private
parties bringing suit under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act must
prove intentional discrimination even though federal agencies re-
tained the ability to find violations of Title VI based solely on the
discriminatory effects caused by their grant recipients' programs. 121
On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed the
District Court opinion, holding that a private right of action existed
to bring an action under federal agencies' discriminatory effects
regulations. 122 This 1997 appeal remanded the case back to the Dis-
trict Court for disposition in light of the Appellate Court opinion. 123
Although Pennsylvania appealed the circuit court's decision to the
United States Supreme Court in 1998, the case ultimately resolved
when the Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection
114. Id at415-16.
115. Id at415.
116. Id
117. Id
118. Id. at 417.
119. 469 U.S. 287, 293 (1985).
120. 463 U.S. 582 (1983).
121. Chester Residents Concerned for Quality Living, 944 F. Supp. at 417, n.5.
122. Chester Residents Concerned for Quality Living v. Seif, 132 F.3d 925 (3d
Cir. 1997).
123. Id. at 927.
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revoked the waste permit at issue. 124 DEP revoked the permit at the
request of SRS after their initial time period to construct the facility
under the original air quality plan approval expired. 125 Under the
Title V program of the Clean Air Act, the facility would have been
required to submit a new air quality plan that met with the more
stringent regulations that had gone into effect. 126 In light of the per-
mits revocation, the Supreme Court dismissed the state's appeal cit-
ing irrelevance and vacated the Appellate Court decision. 127
Nonetheless, the Supreme Court resolved the Title VI legal ques-
tions raised in Chester a few years later in Alexander v. Sandoval.12 8
Although the case took place outside of the environmental context,
the Court ruled that no private right of action existed for plaintiffs to
bring Title VI suits based on the disparate impacts caused by a fed-
eral grant recipient's program. 129 In the case, a 5-4 majority decided
that the plaintiffs class action suit against the Alabama Department
of Public Safety for its policy of limiting the Alabama Driver's li-
cense exam to English as a violation of the U.S. Department of
Transportation's Title VI regulations could not be sustained because
no private right of action exists under the statute to enforce agency
disparate impact regulations.13
0
Despite the Court's decision in Alexander v. Sandoval, one glim-
mer of hope remained for environmental justice claimants seeking to
bring a civil rights action that did not depend on intentional dis-
crimination.13 ' The residents of the Waterfront South neighborhood
in Camden, New Jersey tested that hope when they filed an action
under U.S. Code § 1983 against the New Jersey Department of Envi-
ronmental Protection. 32  The case, filed prior to the Supreme
124. Pa. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., Envtl. Hearing Board Dismisses SRS AIR Appeal.
http://www.dep.state.pa.us/dep/DEPUTATE/polycomni/update/05-29-98/052998
u8.htm (last visited Mar. 26, 2007).
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Seif v. Chester Residents Concerned for Quality Living, 524 U.S. 974
(1998).
128. Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275 (2001).
129. Id.
130. Id. at 293.
131. Bradford C. Mank, Using Section 1983 to Enforce Title VI's Section 602
Regulations, 49 U. KAN. L. REv. 321 (2001).
132. S. Camden Citizens in Action v. N.J. Dep't. of Envtl. Prot., 145 F. Supp.
2d 446 (D.N.J. 2001) (§ 1983 providing in relevant part, "Every person who, un-
der color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or
Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citi-
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Court's ruling in Sandoval, attempted to use the private right of ac-
tion that exists under § 1983 to enforce the EPA's discriminatory
effect regulations.' 33 Claimant's initial complaint alleged that a pro-
posed cement processing facility would cause a discriminatory im-
pact on residents in violation of EPA's Title VI regulations.' 34 The
neighborhood hosted two Superfund sites, multiple abandoned
and/or contaminated industrial sites, chemical companies, waste fa-
cilities, a petroleum coke transfer station, and more permitted pollut-
ing facilities. 135 The plaintiffs further contended that the New Jersey
Department of Environmental Protection (NJDEP) granted addi-
tional permits for a regional sewage treatment facility, an incinera-
tor, and a power plant in the neighborhood. 136 Consequently, the
claimants maintained that the Waterfront South community, made up
of 63% African-Americans, 28.3% Hispanics, and 9% white resi-
dents, hosted 20% of the city's contaminated sites and had more than
double the number of permitted air polluting operations than an area
within a typical New Jersey zip code.' 37 As relief, the South Cam-
den Citizens in Action (SCCIA) sought to enjoin the issuance of the
air permit for the cement processing facility due to NJDEP's failure
to assess the disparate impact the facilities operation would cause. 138
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed the Dis-
trict Court decision granting the injunction. 139  Specifically, the
court held that the District Court erred in finding it likely that the
plaintiffs would succeed on the merits of the case. 140 To support its
decision, the court looked to the reasoning of the majority in Alexan-
der v. Sandoval, writing:
zen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the dep-
rivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and
laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other
proper proceeding for redress...." See 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Although plaintiffs ini-
tially filed suit under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 at 42 U.S.C. § 2000d
to § 2000d-7, the District Court provided them with leave to amend the complaint
following the Court's ruling in Alexander v. Sandoval.
133. S. Camden Citizens in Action, 145 F. Supp. 2d at 509-10.
134. Id. at 450-51.
135. S. Camden Citizens in Action, 274 F.3d 771, 775 (N.J. 2001).
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 776-77.
139. Id. at 791.
140. Id.
[VOL. XX
2009] ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE AND EQUAL PROTECTION 75
Inasmuch as the [Supreme] Court found previously that
the only right conferred by section 601 was to be free of
intentional discrimination, it does not follow that the right
to be free from disparate impact discrimination can be lo-
cated in section 602. In fact, it cannot. In sum, the regu-
lations, though assumedly valid, are not based on any
federal right present in the statute.14 '
Although the analysis of the enforceability of the EPA's regula-
tions under § 1983 was one of first impression, the court did its best
to ground its opinion solidly in the analysis of the Alexander v.
Sandoval majority opinion. 14 In doing so, the court required that a
clear congressional intention to prohibit disparate racial impacts be
present in the underlying statute that plaintiffs claim creates a right
enforceable under § 1983.143 Further, the court specifically rejected
arguments that agency regulations could form the basis for establish-
ing enforceable federal rights under statutes that already establish
such rights.144 As a matter of policy, the court further supported its
decision based on the concern that the right to bring private suits
based on disparate racial impacts could have sweeping ramifications,
and therefore should be expressly provided by congressional action
rather than an interpretation by the courts. 145
The District Court ultimately resolved the case in 2006, five years
after the issuance of the original injunction. 146 In its decision, it ad-
141. Id, at 789-90.
142. Id. at 789, n.12.
143. Id. at 790. Because the majority in Alexander v. Sandoval had so recently
decided that no congressional intent to provide a private right of action based on
disparate racial impacts could be found in Title VI, the court used the same analy-
sis to determine that Congress also lacked the intent to create a federal right that
persons be free from disparate racial impacts caused by the programs of federal
grant recipients.
144. Id.
145. The court writes, "[i]t is plain that in view of the pervasiveness of state and
local licensing provisions and the likely applicability of Title VI to the agencies
involved, the district court's opinion has the potential, if followed elsewhere, to
subject vast aspects of commercial activities to disparate impact analyses by the
relevant agencies... [w]hile we do not express an opinion on whether that would
be desirable, we do suggest that if it is to happen, then Congress and not a court
should say so as a court's authority is to interpret rather than to make the law." Id.
at 790.
146. S. Camden Citizens in Action v. N.J. Dep't. of Envtl. Prot., No. Civ. A.
01-702, 2006 W.L. 1097498 (D.N.J.) (Mar. 31, 2006).
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dressed the outstanding claim that the NJDEP intentionally discrimi-
nated against the residents of South Camden in issuing the permit.1
47
Under that analysis the court on remand rejected each of the plain-
tiffs' contentions that NJDEP purposefully granted the permit based
on the race of the residents. 148 The court went on to find the follow-
ing:
When the Court grants all inferences in favor of Plain-
tiffs, including evidence of potentially discriminatory en-
forcement and of a foreseeable disparate impact, Plain-
tiffs still fail to establish that NJDEP issued permits to
SLC because of, not merely in spite of, its adverse effects
upon the minority community of Waterfront South. 149
South Camden, like the other cases surveyed, represents the contem-
porary experience of many racial minorities today.
150
IV. FACING THE BROKEN BRIDGE - EQUAL PROTECTION AND TITLE VI
JURISPRUDENCE
A. Equal Protection Jurisprudential Theory
A broad and deep literature has developed over the past three dec-
ades around antidiscrimination and equal protection jurispru-
dence. 15 1 Most of the articles of the time period attempt to make
147. Id at 1.
148. Id. at 36.
149. Id, (The court's decision falls squarely within the vast majority of race
based Equal Protection cases challenging race neutral policies decided over the
past thirty years. As in those cases, the Arlington Heights factors serve to justify
discriminatory racial impacts that result from facially neutral policies).
150. See infra Part l.
151. See Julie Chi-hye Suk, Equal by Comparison: Unsettling Assumptions of
Antidiscrimination Law, 55 AM. J. COMP. L. 295 (2007); Stephen A. Plass, Privat-
izing Antidiscrimination Law with Arbitration: The Title VII Proof Problem, 68
MONT. L. REv. 151 (2007); Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Structural Turn and the
Limits of Antidiscrimination Law, 94 CAL. L. REv. 1 (2006); Gregory Mitchell &
Phillip E. Tetlock, Antidiscrimination Law and the Perils of Mindreading, 67
OHIO ST. L.J. 1023 (2006); Sheila R. Foster, Causation in Antidiscrimination Law:
Beyond Intent Versus Impact, 41 Hous. L. REv. 1469 (2005); Viktor Winkler,
Dubious Heritage: The German Debate on the Antidiscrimination Law, 14
TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 959 (2005); Ivan E. Bodensteiner, Review of
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sense of the Supreme Court's antidiscrimination jurisprudence under
the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution, the
civil rights legislation of the 1960s or both.112 The constant theme
across the literature sounds in the reconciliation of the landmark
Brown v. Board of Education and its progeny with the subsequent
decisions of the Burger and Rehnquist Courts contracting the reach
and warrants for race based antidiscrimination findings.' 53 In this
section, the article explains the rejection of environmental racism
claims in the federal courts using democratic process and motive
review theory; the article strengthens this insight through considera-
tion of the "perpetrator's perspective" of discrimination and the eth-
nic competition model of racial disparity used by the Supreme Court
in its Equal Protection Clause Jurisprudence.'1 5
4
Beyond the assertion that intentional discrimination is required to
prove a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment or Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, this section
situates the level of intentionality required in the environmental de-
cision making process along a continuum with other public decisions
and relates the level of intent required to constitute a violation to the
process used to authorize pollution in predominantly minority com-
munities. Because racial disparity is relevant to courts' analysis of
racial discrimination under the Village ofArlington Heights, the sec-
tion also explains the ever decreasing significance of the disparate
impacts of environmental pollution to the outcome of federal "envi-
ronmental racism" cases. This section culminates in the development
of an "environmental racism" rubric that classifies environmental
decisions based on their exposure to an equal protection challenge.
Specifically, the rubric charts the assortment of public environmental
decisions and the level of deference provided by courts together with
the evidentiary burden necessary to prove discriminatory intent.
David E. Bernstein's You Can't Say That! The Growing Threat to Civil Liberties
from Antidiscrimination Laws, 31 J.C. & U.L. 437 (2005); P.K. Runkles-Pearson,
The Changing Relations of Family & the Workplace: Extending Antidiscrimina-
tion Laws to Parents and Nonparents Alike, 77 N.Y.U. L. REv. 833 (2002); Chetan
Gulati, Genetic Antidiscrimination Laws in Health Insurance: A Misguided Solu-
tion, 4 QUINNIPIAC HEALTH L.J. 149 (2001).
152. Most antidiscrimination scholarship falls into the later category, which
would be expected in light of the shared historical development of the two areas.
153. See sources cited supra note 151.
154. While these do not represent all of the mechanisms used to "make sense"
of the Court's decisions, they account for a substantial share of the commentary.
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Legal commentators' concern with the Supreme Court's increas-
ingly restrictive exposition of the protections offered by the Equal
Protection Clause of the United States Constitution has dominated
journal articles on the subject for over thirty years.155 The articles
cover a range of approaches. While some commentators decry the
Court's turn away from the commitments of Brown and its prog-
eny, 156 others challenge the Court's reliance upon "colorblind consti-
tutionalism."' 157 A much smaller group commends the court for their
principled decisions 158 while others use psychological insights to
critique the Court's intentional discrimination standards. 159  This
section draw insights from an additional group of articles that en-
deavor to explain the Court's decisions based on an internal logic
woven through the cases and a broader jurisprudential analysis.160
155. See Michael Selmi, Proving Intentional Discrimination: The Reality of
Supreme Court Rhetoric, 86 GEO. L.J. 279, 284-85 (1997); David A. Strauss, Dis-
criminatory Intent and the Taming of Brown, 56 U. CHI. L. REv. 935 (1989);
George Rutherglen, Symposium: The Jurisprudence of Justice Stevens: Panel VI:
Equal Prot.: Disparate Impact, Discrimination, and the Essentially Contested
Concept of Equality, 74 FORDHAM L. REv. 2313 (2006); Olatunde C.A. Johnson,
Disparity Rules, 107 COLUM. L. REv. 374 (2007); Stacy E. Seicshnaydre, Is the
road to Disparate Impact Paved With Good Intentions?: Stuck on State of Mind in
Antidiscrimination Law, 42 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 1141 (2007); Daniel R. Ortiz,
The Myth of Intent in Equal Prot., 41 STAN. L. REv. 1105 (1989); Samuel Issa-
charoff, Making the Violation Fir the Remedy: The Intent Standard and Equal
Prot. Law, 92 YALE L.J. 328 (1982); Reva B. Siegel, Brown at Fifty: Equality
Talk: Antisubordination and Anticlassification Values in Constitutional Struggles
Over Brown, 117 HARV. L. REv. 1470 (2004); Sheila Foster, Intent and Incoher-
ence, 72 TUL. L. REv. 1065 (1998); Richard A. Primus, Equal Prot. and Disparate
Impact: Round Three, 117 HARv. L. REV. 493 (2003).
156. See sources cited supra note 155.
157. Id.
158. See Richard McAdams, Cooperation & Conflict: The Economics of
Group Status Production and Race Discrimination, 108 HARv. L. REv. 1003
(1995) (for an example from an interesting economic perspective).
159. See Charles R. Lawrence I1, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Prot.: Reckoning
With Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REv. 317 (1987); Charles R. Lawrence II,
Unconscious Discrimination Twenty Years Later: Application & Evolution, 40
CONN. L. REV. 931 (2008).
160. While other important articles offer viable accounts, their examination
extends beyond the scope of this article. See, e.g., Derrick Bell, Brown v. Board of
Education and the Interest-Convergence Dilemma, 93 HARV. L. REv. 518, 533
(1980); Daniel R. Ortiz, The Myth ofIntent in Equal Prot., 41 STAN. L. REV. 1105
(1989); Reva B. Siegel, Brown at Fifty: Equality Talk: Antisubordination and
Anticlassification Values in Constitutional Struggles Over Brown, 117 HARV. L.
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Foremost are Motive Review and Democratic Process Theory.
This theoretical framework explains the deferential approach taken
by judges in reviewing Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection
challenges to the decisions of legislative bodies and executive au-
thorities. A key feature of this section is the specific application of
this theory to environmental decision making. The "Perpetrator's
Perspective" of racial discrimination and the ethnic competition
model of racial disparity are also integrated in order to contextualize
this "race neutral" mechanism for judicial review in light of two
dominant trends in Supreme Court race discrimination jurisprudence.
The product of this approach is the creation of an "environmental
racism" rubric that categorizes environmental decisions and the level
of deference the courts should provide with the level of evidence
required to prove an Equal Protection Clause violation.
The first of the three articles considered in this section is a seminal
work in Critical Race Theory by David Alan Freeman."' In Legiti-
mizing Racial Discrimination through Antidiscrimination Law: A
Critical Review of Supreme Court Doctrine, professor Freeman
chronicles the twenty-five year history of Supreme Court decisions
on equal protection and racial discrimination.' Professor Free-
man's elaboration of two perspectives on discrimination-
perpetrator and victim-available to the Courts serves as one of the
articles central insights. 63 The perpetrator perspective understands
discrimination as discrete actions carried out by individual actors
against particular victims.164 From this perspective discrimination
appears as historic and isolated events. 165 America's history of slav-
ery and Jim Crow segregation constitute irrelevant background fac-
tors under this view unless directly linked to the alleged violation. 1
66
In contrast, the victim perspective focuses on current social condi-
REV. 1470 (2004); Sheila Foster, Intent and Incoherence, 72 TUL. L. REV. 1065
(1998).
161. KIMBERLE WILLIAMS CRENSHAW et al., CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE
KEY WRITINGS THAT FORMED THE MOVEMENT (New Press 1996).
162. Although these articles and my analysis focus on the race cases under
equal protection they may offer a helpful background story to the Court's gender,
disability, and age jurisprudence.
163. Alan Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination through Antidiscrimi-
nation Law: A Critical Review of Supreme Court Doctrine, 62 MINN. L. REV.
1049, 1057 (1978).
164. Id. at 1053-54.
165. Id. at 1053-55.
166. Id. at 1052-53.
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tions and their relation to historic mistreatment. 16 7 From the vic-
tim's perspective, discrimination problems cannot be resolved until
the conditions created by discrimination have been eliminated.
168
This view clearly contradicts the perpetrator perspective that con-
strues the neutralization of the proscribed behavior as a remedy of
the established violation. 169
The twin concepts of fault and causation provide the strong struc-
tural artifice holding up the perpetrator perspective. 170 Fault allows
antidiscrimination law to single out bad actors traversing the soci-
ety's norm of racial neutrality. 171 Through it, a large class of "inno-
cents" is constructed who lack legal and moral responsibility for the
discriminatory results of their conduct because they act without a
desire to do so. 172  The social ramification of this perspective's
dominance can be seen in the resentment expressed by otherwise
"innocent" members of the racial majority when remedial measures
for historic discrimination such as affirmative action and reparations
are discussed. 173 A vision of America as an equal opportunity meri-
tocracy only occasionally sullied by aberrant discriminating actors
emanates from this perspective. 174
Causation balances fault in the perpetrator perspective. 7 By re-
quiring that a defendant's actions create a "discriminatory effect,"
causation places objective discriminatory conduct beyond the reach
167. Id. ("This perspective includes both the objective conditions of life-lack
of jobs, lack of money, lack of housing-and the consciousness associated with
those objective conditions-lack of choice and lack of human individuality in
being forever perceived as a member of a group rather than as an individual.").
168. Id. at 1053.
169. Id (Affirmative action and reparations, both largely unpopular with the
society's racial majority, grow out of this perspective.).
170. Id. at 1054.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 1055; see also Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal
Prot.: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN L. REV. 317 (1987) (exam-
ining the prevalence and importance of unconscious bias in American society and
the impotence of current antidiscrimination law to address it).
173. See id. (While reparations programs are overwhelmingly rejected by
whites, affirmative action is disfavored by a majority of white Americans); see
also id. at note 83; Jeffrey M. Jones, Race, Ideology, and Support for Affirmative
Action, GALLUP, August 23, 2005, available at http://www.gallup.com/poll/
18091/Race-Ideology-Support-Affrimative-Action.aspx. ("Whites are much more
divided [than blacks], with opponents outnumbering supporters [of affirmative
action] by a 49% to 44% margin.").
174. Freeman, supra note 163, at 1054.
175. Id. at 1056-57.
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of legal protection when no unique harm befalls its victims. 176 This
explains why the Court could find no violation of the Equal Protec-
tion Clause when jurisdictions across the American South openly
closed down public facilities and services rather than provide them
to blacks on an equal basis. 177
Professor Freeman's article skillfully traces the Court's formalistic
adoption of the "perpetrator perspective" and the challenge it faced
in crafting remedies that correlated to the violations it identified that
did not overly embrace the "victim perspective."' 178 Professor Free-
man accounts for dissonance in the Court's decisions in the twenty-
five year period following Brown as the Court's ongoing efforts to
legitimize the continued material subordination of blacks in the
country while at the same time proscribing formal discrimination by
public officials. 179 Freeman marks the creation of remedies that of-
fer the mirage of resolution without endorsing the "victim perspec-
tive" as no mean feat rather skillfully accomplished by the Court. 180
This article maintains that the perpetrator perspective provides the
framework courts begin with in investigating environmental racism
claims. Typically, environmental racism claimants bring cases based
on their perspective as victims of polluting facilities that operate out-
side of the bounds of their control. For some, their experiences as
racial minorities in the broader American society place them within a
historical narrative fraught with political neglect and economic ex-
ploitation. Redlining, housing discrimination, segregated schools,
and limited employment opportunities all color claimants perception
of the government and businesses in their communities. In contrast,
courts begin with a blind eye to these other factors. They focus al-
most exclusively on determining whether plaintiffs have presented
sufficient evidence that government actors acted with racial malice
in approving a commercial or public use of property or the release of
pollutants into the environment. For the courts, evidence must dem-
176. Id. (Freeman cites, as examples of this, the post-Brown cases upholding
state actions of closing public schools, swimming pools, and other segregated
public facilities, rather than complying with desegregation orders.); Palmer v.
Thompson, 403 U.S. 217 (1971); Evans v. Abney, 396 U.S. 435 (1970). A spe-
cific example in the environmental law context can be seen in E. Bibb Twiggs
Neighborhood Ass'n. v. Macon-Bibb County Planning & Zoning Comm'n, 706 F.
Supp. 880, 884-85 (M.D. Ga. 1989), af'd, 896 F.2d 1264 (11 th Cir. 1989).
177. Freeman, supra note 163, at 1057.
178. Id. at 1054-57.
179. Id. at 1050-51.
180. Id. at 1057.
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onstrate that one or more government officials, who are presumed
innocent, acted on racial rather than commercial or environmental
grounds in making a particular decision. Otherwise, officials will
lack fault for the disparate racial effects that may result from their
decisions. Moreover, the technical nature of environmental deci-
sions considered in tandem with the commercial interests that typi-
cally drive them give officials a host of race neutral reasons to au-
thorize the placement of polluting facilities in minority communities
and to grant pollution permit requests. Through the blinders of the
perpetrators perspective, environmental decision making seems less
likely to be associated with improper racial motives than many other
government actions regardless of the racial disparate effects associ-
ated with them because government actors lack "fault" for the dis-
proportionate impacts that may result from their use of race neutral
decision making criteria. This perspective also means that courts
will discount pollution facilities and activities that impact whites and
racial minorities alike as evidence that race was not the basis of a
government decision. Even when the particular harm risked or ex-
posure experienced by racial minorities is higher than that facing
their white counterparts, courts will view the impact on whites as
evidence that something other than race "caused" the alleged harm.
Sheila Foster provides the critical explanation of the Court's equal
protection jurisprudence, for the purposes of this article.18 1 In Intent
and Incoherence, Professor Foster provides a cogent analysis of the
Court's equal protection decisions by applying "motive review the-
ory" and its antecedent "democratic process theory" to explain the
seeming dissonance of the Court's decisions. 182 The article speaks
directly to the divergent levels of consciousness required by the
Court to satisfy the discriminatory intent standard applied to the
Equal Protection Clause. 1
83
Refining, extending, and critiquing the arguments advanced by
Daniel Ortiz in the Myth of Intent in Equal Protection, Professor
Foster posits the coherence of Supreme Court equal protection deci-
sions when viewed in light of "institutional process and substantive
concerns." 184 Under process theory, the Court self consciously exer-
181. See Foster, Intent andIncoherence, supra note 155 at 1065.
182. Id. at 1070-71.
183. Id. at 1069. (This consciousness can range from a specific desire to harm
the affected group, to general knowledge that harm is substantially certain to oc-
cur, to an unconscious bias towards the affected group.).
184. Id. at 1121-25.
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cises "judicial restraint" when examining executive and legislative
actions.1 85 This deference supports the Court's majoritarian prefer-
ence for democratic policy decisions. 186  By restricting its role to
examining the legitimacy of the process followed by its fellow
branches, the Court avoids "substituting its policy preferences for
those of other, more representative and accountable actors." 187 As a
"counter-majoritarian" institution, l18 under process theory, court
decisions overturning the actions of other branches absent the viola-
tion of "clear and determinative constitutional provisions" represents
the frustration rather than the furtherance of American democracy.1 89
Motive review theory envisions the Court as the "corrector of de-
mocratic process defects." 190  Racial prejudice and bias represent
improper legislative and administrative motives that corrupt an oth-
erwise democratic process; when these are found present in the mo-
tivation of governmental actors courts properly withhold judicial
deference and apply judicial scrutiny to remedy the defective proc-
ess. 191 Ortiz shows that the Court uses the intent requirement to dis-
tinguish the protection of "political, criminal, and educational rights"
from the protection of "social and economic goods, like jobs and
housing" as a way of facilitating liberalism's commitment to the pro-
tection of individual choice in a societal area relegated to "market
control."' 192  Applying this reasoning, the Court's decision to distin-
185. IdatlO-01.
186. Id. at 1101-02.
187. Id. at 1102.
188. For a contrary view of the Court's counter-majoritarian nature in race
cases, see Girardeau A. Spann, Proposition 209, 47 DuKE L.J. 187, 278-86 (1997)
(examining the Supreme Court's role as a majoritarian institution in significant
cases involving the rights of blacks and other minorities); Carlton Waterhouse,
Avoiding Another Step In A Series Of Unfortunate Legal Events: A Consideration
Of Black Life Under American Law From 1619 To 1972 AndA Challenge To Pre-
vailing Notions Of Legally Based Reparations, 26 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 207
(2006) (exploring the role of law in the historic mistreatment of African Ameri-
cans).
189. Foster, Intent and Incoherence, supra note 155 at 1101-02.
190. Id. at 1102.
191. Id. at 1102-03.
192. Daniel R. Ortiz, Myth of Intent in Equal Prot., 41 STAN. L. REv. 1105,
1141-42 (1989) ("In making this distinction, intent doctrine reflects our prevailing
political ideology-liberalism-which is a system of values rooted in the belief that
the state should allow every individual to pursue his own perception of the good.
Since such an aim requires the state to remain neutral between competing concep-
tions of the good, the state can legitimately act only to allow individuals more
fully to pursue their own private conceptions .... Remaining social interaction is
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guish the standard for establishing an equal protection violation from
that used under Title VII in the case of Washington v. Davis falls
into place. 193 Unlike voting, school desegregation, and jury selec-
tion cases where the Court allows a finding of discriminatory intent
with something less than a showing of motivation, housing and em-
ployment cases under equal protection require a higher evidentiary
burden to limit judicial intervention in these otherwise market con-
trolled areas. 194
Using Motive Review Theory, Foster extends Ortiz's work show-
ing that the degree of consciousness required to cause an Equal Pro-
tection Clause violation varies within the areas identified by Ortiz as
requiring a showing of discriminatory motivation. 95 She explains:
The degree of judicial restraint is linked, in turn, to the
ability of disparate impact evidence to trigger the demand
for a justification from the decisionmaker. In other
words, as the reasons for judicial deference decline, the
relevance of disparate impact to the intent inference esca-
lates. This evidentiary variation, in turn, significantly de-
termines the degree of consciousness-or level of intent
that can violate the Equal Protection Clause. As a result,
the intent doctrine can be conceptualized along a contin-
uum, instead of a bright line, separating the decision's
impact from the decisionmaker's intent." 
196
Democratic process concerns, institutional competence, and a deci-
sion's potential burden on a challenger's political or fundamental
rights sway the Court's evidentiary requirements in equal protection
cases. 197 Democratic process concerns-Foster's "democratic vali-
dation concerns"--reflect the Court's respect for the superior policy
governed by free markets since that mechanism is thought best to allow persons to
achieve their individually chosen objectives in free trade.").
193. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976); Vill. of Arlington Heights
v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977) (requiring that plaintiffs meet the
substantial evidentiary burden of showing the defendants discriminatory motiva-
tion).
194. Foster, Intent andIncoherence, supra note 155 at 1098-99.
195. Id. at 1098-99.
196. Id. at 1121. The level of judicial restraint depends on the right affected by
the decision, the decision maker's relation to the democratic process, and the na-
ture of the decision being made. Id.
197. Id.
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making authority of the executive and legislative branches based on
their electoral accountability through the democratic process. 198
Institutional competence considerations involve the Court's defer-
ence to the executive and legislative branches but differ from democ-
ratic process concerns. Decisions involving an executive or legisla-
tive branch exercise of "core constitutional duties" along with those
related to specific expertise of the decision maker represent judg-
ments reflecting particular competencies of the decision makers and
not the Court thereby justifying a higher evidentiary standard for
plaintiffs to prove intent.199 Potential burdens on a challenger's po-
litical or fundamental rights can provide a basis for lowering the evi-
dentiary burden of the challenger in light of the substantive rights at
issue.200 By weighing these three factors, the Court shifts the level
of consciousness required to violate the Equal Protection Clause
along the continuum.
Legislative and executive policy decisions beyond the scope of
fundamental or political rights make up one end of the continuum.202
The Court provides the highest level of judicial deference in these
cases--"super restraint"--refusing to interject their judgment absent
a showing of specific intent to harm. 0 3 At the opposite extreme, the
Court applies "minimal restraint" as the lowest level of judicial def-
erence. In these cases, the Court will require a justification from a
government decision maker after a showing of substantial adminis-
trative discretion and a disparate impact.205 Between these extremes,
the Court applies "intermediate restraint., 20 6 Under this analysis, the
198. Id. at 1101-02.
199. Id. at 1124-25.
200. Id. at 1125-28.
201. Id. at 1121-22.
202. Id. at 1122.
203. Id.
204. Id. at 1132-34.
205. Id. Jury cases based on peremptory challenges and the challenge to the
key man system for grand jury selection used in Texas make up these cases. Cas-
taneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482 (1977). The lower standard for these cases results
from the Court's protection of the Sixth Amendment right of the defendant, the
increased institutional competence of the Court to review the decision, and the
decreased democratic process concerns in reviewing decisions of administrative
bodies. Foster, Intent and Incoherence, supra note 155 at 1132-33. Unlike the
actions of directly elected legislators and some executive branch personnel, admin-
istrative agency policy decisions warrant decreased democratic process concerns.
Id. at 1128-31.
206. Foster, Intent and Incoherence, supra note 155, at 1127-28.
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Court may supplement its review of the decision maker's stated ra-
tionale with consideration of the social and historical context of the
207decision. If a finding of general intent is made then the Court will
also find a decision presumptively unconstitutional absent a justifica-
tory showing by the decision maker.20 8 Using this approach, the
Court distinguishes the level of intentionality required for equal pro-
tection violations-placing a high burden on parties claiming viola-
tions resulting from legislative or executive decisions over economic
and social issues that do not implicate substantive rights.2 °9
This article places environmental decisions into the continuum of
government decision making developed by Foster. Unlike govern-
ment action that involves a fundamental right like voting or jury se-
lection, courts view environmental decisions as market based actions
that require plaintiffs to meet a higher evidentiary standard of intent
or consciousness for proof. This flows from the lower constitu-
tional significance accorded burdens associated with non-
fundamental rights. Institutional competencies further support
higher standards of intent in environmental decision making cases
for administrative agency and quasi-legislative bodies. Administra-
tive agencies follow highly technical and race neutral federal and
state environmental guidelines in making their decisions to grant or
deny pollution permit requests. Staffed with scientists and engineers
tasked with evaluating a permit applicants compliance with technical
standards, administrative agencies have specialized knowledge that
courts lack. Courts, in turn, defer to these special competencies and
require a higher burden of proof to show that an agency acted with a
discriminatory intent. Likewise, local land use decisions made by
quasi-legislative bodies with the authority to grant or deny particular
land uses receive deference from courts. Both democratic process
concerns and institutional competencies support court deference to
these bodies. County commissions, city councils, and similar bodies
reflect local democratic decision making by voters regarding local
land use policies and implementation. Courts defer to the actions of
these bodies based on democratic process concerns, as such. How-
ever, many local bodies have been elected with the particular pur-
pose of balancing the economic needs of local communities with the
interests of commercial entities. Courts see these bodies as exercis-
207. Id. at 1128.
208. Id.
209. Id. at 1098-99.
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ing particular competencies to weigh the competing interests of their
communities in economic and other matters. In turn, courts afford
deference to these bodies' special abilities to ascertain and act in the
best interests of local citizens. Based on this deference the local land
use decisions of these entities warrant a higher evidentiary burden on
plaintiffs that members acted with racial malice.
Matthew J. Lindsay provides the final analytical model, examined
in this section. 21 In his recent article, How Antidiscrimination Law
Learned to Live with Racial Inequality, Lindsay explores the Courts
move from concern with racial disparity as indicia of discrimination
in the Civil Rights Era to a doctrine of colorblind competition that
explains economic, educational, and other racial disparities in soci-
ety as a reflection of ethnic differences resulting from racially neu-
tral market based meritocracy. 211 Lindsay maintains that following
passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964212 antidiscrimination law in
the federal courts can be divided into three periods: the Civil Rights
Era; Colorblind Equality; and Colorblind Competition. 213 This arti-
cle considers each period proposed by Lindsay for the luminary spot-
light it casts on equal protection jurisprudence. 214
From 1965-1971, federal courts and the United States Department
of Justice sought ways to put the new antidiscrimination laws fully
into practice. 215 The justice department, the Equal Employment Op-
portunity Commission, and others looked to racial proportionality in
employment as a means to evaluate compliance with Title VII' s216
antidiscrimination requirements for the workplace.21 7 The underly-
ing logic commonly employed by the courts and federal officials was
that absent racial discrimination blacks and other racial groups
would experience proportionate representation in the labor force. 2 18
210. Matthew J. Lindsay, How Antidiscrimination Law Learned to Live with
Racial Inequality, 75 U. CIN. L. REv. 87 (2006).
211. Id. at88-90.
212. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000 et seq. (1964).
213. Lindsay, How Antidiscrimination Law Learned to Live with Racial Ine-
quality, supra note 210, at 88-92.
214. See infra notes 216-250 and accompanying text.
215. Lindsay, How Antidiscrimination Law Learned to Live with Racial Ine-
quality, supra note 210, at 93-95.
216. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000(a) (1964).
217. Lindsay, How Antidiscrimination Law Learned to Live with Racial Ine-
quality, supra note 210, at 95-100.
218. Id.
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In response to concerns that more affirmative steps were required
to facilitate a non-discriminatory and hence representative work-
force, President Lyndon Johnson began and President Richard Nixon
continued city based initiatives in federal contracting. 219 These pro-
grams required that the construction industry and its unions create
hiring plans that would allow them to reach certain levels of minor-
ity representation.220 When challenged, the federal courts upheld
these programs using the same logic that applied to the ongoing Title
VII cases-absent discrimination blacks would have proportionate
representation in desirable jobs. 221 In Griggs v. Duke Power the
Supreme Court weighed in and held that a racial disparity in the
workforce based on facially neutral hiring criteria was sufficient to
show discrimination and to establish a violation of Title VII unless
the employer could connect the criteria with a business necessity.
222
Reflecting the logic of the lower courts and federal officials of the
time, the Court viewed the employer's lack of black employees in
certain positions resulting from its facially neutral criteria as indicia
of discrimination requiring a justification by the employer.223
The next period, in Lindsay's analysis reflects the federal courts
turn away from racial discrimination as the cause of racial disparity
in education, employment and other aspects of society. 224 Justice
Powell's opinion in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke
provides the quintessential expression of the reasoning behind the
social and legal turn away from expectations of racial proportional-
ity. 225 Powell's opinion stands out in the landmark plurality deci-
sion for crafting the diversity rationale for affirmative action recent
upheld in Grutter v. Bollinger.226  Upon investigation, Powell's
opinion also stands out for reformulating the Court's understanding
of racial disparity in American society and its relationship to dis-
219. Id. 98-100. See PHILIP RUBIO, A HISTORY OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 149-
156 (Univ. Press of Miss. 2001), for a discussion of these initiatives and other
aspects of affirmative action's development during this period.
220. Lindsay, How Antidiscrimination Law Learned to Live with Racial Ine-
quality, supra note 210, at 99-100.
221. Id. at 100-04.
222. Id. at 104-07; See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
223. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 429-30.
224. Lindsay, How Antidiscrimination Law Learned to Live with Racial Ine-
quality, supra note 210, at 109-15.
225. Regents of Univ. of Ca. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
226. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
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crimination. 227 As Lindsay points out, 228 Powell leaves the original
purpose and understanding of the Equal Protection Clause as provid-
ing freedom and protection to the slave race to the universalized
purpose of providing protection to what had become "a nation of
minorities." In making this turn Powell, recast the preceding two
hundred and forty four year history of legally proscribed subjugation
and subordination of American blacks 2 0 preceding the civil rights
movement with the experience of discrimination against ethnic im-
migrants.231 By defining America as a "nation of minorities" and
equating blacks experience with that of other more successfully as-
similated immigrants 232 Powell argues that the "white majority" con-
sists of a range of ethnic immigrants who are equally threatened with
discrimination from governmental actors seeking to remedy the ef-
fects of past discrimination by whites against other groups. 233
Connecting Powell's argument with the writings of colorblind ad-
vocates of the time, Lindsay illustrates the twofold effect of the ar-
234gument. He elaborates:
227. Lindsay, How Antidiscrimination Law Learned to Live with Racial Ine-
quality, supra note 210, at 110-12.
228. Id.
229. Regents of Univ. of Ca., 438 U.S. at 291-93.
230. Not to mention the conquest of its Native Americans.
231. Regents of Univ. of Ca., 438 U.S. at 292. He writes, "Each had to struggle-
-- and, to some extent, struggles still -- to overcome.. .prejudices. Id. at 292. A full
examination of the validity of this claim is beyond the scope of this article. The
experience of Jewish immigrants fleeing Nazi persecution, Vietnamese immigrants
escaping the Killing Fields, and Cubans departing Castro's Cuba to come to the
United States, however, seems of a different type than that of Native Americans
and blacks whose primary experience of persecution came from the colonial, state,
and federal governments as well as its diverse citizens pursuant to its laws. For
these groups, America beckoned not for their "tired poor and huddled masses
yearning to be free." See Carlton Waterhouse, Avoiding Another Step in A Series
of Unfortunate Events, 26 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 207, 227-250 (2006), for an
examination of the significant role of law in the historic mistreatment of African
Americans.
232. In the opinion Powell notes, "Jews, Catholics, Italians, Greeks, and Slavic
groups, continue to be excluded from executive, middle-management, and other
job levels because of discrimination based upon their religion and/or national ori-
gin." Regents of Univ. of Ca., 438 U.S. at 293.
233. Id. at 294.
234. Lindsay, How Antidiscrimination Law Learned to Live with Racial Ine-
quality, supra note 210, at 113-14.
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First, it suggests that African Americans will follow a
path of ethnic progress comparable to that of their immi-
grant forebears--the Irish, eastern European Jews, Ital-
ians, Japanese, and the like. Second, it accounts for racial
inequality as an expression of ethnically distinctive cul-
ture or taste. Racial inequality is thus tolerable because it
is temporary and bound to be diminished with each gen-
eration; but even if it persists, it is merely a natural mani-
festation of black ethnic difference. Under this model,
the goals of the civil rights movement have already been
satisfied, notwithstanding apparent evidence to the con-
trary; all that remains for antidiscrimination law is to po-
lice against the isolated, exceptional acts of illicit dis-
crimination perpetrated by a handful of racist throw-
backs to the Jim Crow era.
Each of these points corresponds to contemporary and popular
views of racial discrimination. Overt discrimination's substantial
diminution and the continued disparity in the educational and eco-
nomic achievement of black, Latino, and Native Americans find
ready explanation in the "culture of poverty" arguments popularized
in the 1980s and still very relevant today. 23 The implicit irony of
the second point Lindsay identifies above is that adherents both es-
pouse "colorblindness" and the essentializing arguments of racial
difference that ascribe positive and negative stereotypes to racial
minorities and ethnic groups to explain their relative successes and
failures in society. 238 The first point, of course, reflects the huge
235. Id.
236. Id, See also JOHN MCWHORTER, LOSING THE RACE: SELF-SABOTAGE IN
BLACK AMERICA (The Free Press 2000), and THOMAS SOWELL, BLACK REDNECKS
& WHITE LIBERALS (Encounter Books 2005).
237. The thesis maintains that the disparity in economic and educational
achievement of blacks, Latinos, Native Americans, and other groups results from
their failure to assimilate the positive norms of American society rather than dis-
crimination. SOWELL, BLACK REDNECKS & WHITE LIBERALS supra note 236. A
second extension of the argument is manifested in less popular genetic inferiority
claims. RICHARD J. HERRNSTEIN & CHARLES MURRAY, BELL CURVE:
INTELLIGENCE & CLASS STRUCTURE IN AMERICAN LIFE (Free Press Paperbacks
1994).
238. Lindsay, How Antidiscrimination Law Learned to Live with Racial Ine-
quality, supra note 210, at 117-18; see ROSALIND S. CHOU & JOE R. FEAGIN, THE
MYTH OF THE MODEL MINORITY: ASIAN AMERICANS FACING RACISM (Paradigm
Publishers 2008); see also FRANK WU, YELLOW: RACE IN AMERICA BEYOND
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paradox at the heart of the argument-blacks, whose arrival predated
that of the immigrants they are compared to by one to two centuries
will succeed just as their predecessors did.239
Lindsay tracks the second thesis through a series of Court deci-
sions to show its prevalence in the Court's Title VII and equal pro-
tection analysis.2 40 In the Title VII context, the courts in Watson v.
Fort Worth Bank and Trust241 and Wards Cove Packing v. Atonio
242
reject the reasoning used in Griggs and its progeny that the lack of
racial proportionality in the work place could rise to the level of a
Title VII violation. In these cases, the majority rejected the argu-
ment that racial disparity reflected racial discrimination that required
an employer to show that it was precipitated by "business necessity"
as established by Griggs.43 The Ward's Cove case represented a
particularly strong expression of the thesis as Justice O'Connor
deemed the ultra segregated positions, dining, and living quarters
between whites and Alaskan natives as reflections of racial differ-
ence and inclinations devoid of legal significance.
244
In its seminal equal protection cases, the Court even more keenly
reflected the "racial difference" argument initiated in Bakke.245 City
of Richmond v. Croson, represents the next step in the Court's break
with its approach adopted in Griggs explicitly reasoning that gross
racial disparity 246 in the construction field in Richmond, Virginia did
BLACK AND WHITE (Basic Books 2001) for an investigation of the pitfalls for
Asians and other groups of accepting the label that they represent "model minori-
ties" in American society who demonstrate the systems racial impartiality through
their success.
239. Acceptance of this proposition while encouraging to some reflects a his-
torical understanding of society that avoids the economic, educational, political,
and psychological consequences of three centuries of collective experiences prior
to the passage of the civil rights act of 1964. Lindsay, How Antidiscrimination
Law Learned to Live with Racial Inequality, supra note 210, at 123-24.
240. Id. at 124-34.
241. See Watson v. Fort Worth Bank and Trust, 487 U.S. 977 (1988).
242. See Wards Cove Packing Co., v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989).
243. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431-32 (1971).
244. Wards Cove Packing Co., 490 U.S. at 642.
245. Id.
246. In this case, it represented the near exclusion of blacks as prime contrac-
tors in the industry. The city council's study revealed that blacks made up less
than 1% of the City's construction contracts and 50% of the city's population.
City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 479 (1989).
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not suggest the presence of racial discrimination.247 In the plurality
opinion, Justice O'Connor, dismisses the uncontested statistical evi-
dence, testimony of witnesses, and findings of the United States
Congress relied upon by the city council that racial discrimination
248against blacks was characteristic of the construction industry. In
this regard, O'Connor expresses the underlying view subsequently
applied to the federal government in Adarand v. Pena that existing
racial disparity in the market place can only be correlated with dis-
crimination through specific and direct evidence of discriminatory
acts.249
The model of ethnic competition rationalizes courts decreased reli-
ance on disparate effects as evidence of improper racial motives. In
environmental racism cases, polluting facilities and other environ-
mental disamenities are disproportionately located in black and La-
tino communities. Though relevant, under the Village of Arlington
Heights, to prove racial discrimination disparate environmental im-
pacts lack the gravity required to offset the high evidentiary burden
required to prove intent by quasi-legislative bodies and administra-
tive environmental agencies. Even stark racial disparities are likely
to be dismissed by courts as the result of free market land use deci-
sions by residents and commercial entities. Moreover, the ethnic
model of competition suggests that the racial disparities associated
with blacks and Latinos today will likely dissipate over time as
blacks and Latinos integrate into the society as other ethnic groups
have. Under this reasoning, racial clusters and communities fit the
paradigm of ethnic enclaves that decrease in significance as subse-
quent generations enjoyed increased opportunities within the broader
society. The prevalence of environmental pollution sources in these
communities, from this perspective, fails to implicate an improper
racial motivation by government actors. More often than not, the
free market will be seen as the reason for racial disparity based on
247. O'Connor states, "the statistics comparing the minority population of
Richmond to the percentage of prime contracts awarded to minority firms had
little or no probative value in establishing prior discrimination." Id. at 503.
O'Connor's opinion in Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education, 476 U.S. 267, 294
(1977), (foreshadows the more elaborated view that she adopts in Croson).
248. City of Richmond, 488 U.S. at 499.
249. See Adarand Constr., Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995) (requiring the
"strictest judicial scrutiny" of racial classifications by Congress even when in-
tended to remedy past discrimination.).
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the availability of land and the depressed rent that residents may en-
joy.
B. Equal Protection Jurisprudential Theory and Environmental
Justice
Environmental justice cases fall typically within the level of what
Foster identifies as intermediate restraint. These claims brought un-
der the Equal Protection Clause seek to overturn state agency deci-
sions regarding the adequacy of a party's pollution permit request on
the grounds of racial discrimination. Rather than alleging that
state actors selected facility locations with the specific intent to ad-
versely affect a particular racial group, plaintiffs routinely allege that
state actors granted permit requests without regard to the discrimina-
tory effect of their decision. 251 Although environmental permitting
decisions are made by administrative entities rather than legislators
or high-level executive officers, they fall clearly within the realm of
economic ordering governed by the market.252 They largely result
from requests for permits from commercial entities engaged in busi-
ness activities. As a matter of geography, state and federal permits
rarely relate to local land use decisions beyond minimum technical
standards of ecological suitability and compliance with local land
use laws. Consideration of the racial makeup or identity of persons
in near proximity to facilities is absent from the state and federal
government permitting process. The identity of persons residing
near facilities is simply a matter of the housing market divorced
from governments' operating practices.
Based on the above perspectives on the Court's equal protection
jurisprudence environmental justice claims, have little chance of
success absent a specific showing of racial discrimination 253 by the
250. See supra text accompanying notes 52-96.
251. Id.
252. Environmental permit decisions routinely reflect the market forces driving
local land use for both public and private entities. FRANK ACKERMAN & KEVIN
GALLAGHER, G-DAE WORKING PAPER No. 00-05: GETrING THE PRICES WRONG:
THE LiMITS OF A MARKET-BASED ENVTL. POLICY 10 (Tufts Univ. Oct., 2000),
available at ase.tufts.edu/gdae/publications/priceswrong.PDF.
253. In these contexts, historic discrimination requires more than past disparity.
Covert or overt racial discrimination typically associated with segregation era
racial bias will be required rather than facially neutral decisions that have a dispa-
rate racial impact. See Dowdell v. City of Apopka, 698 F.2d 1181 (Fla. 1983);
Fortson v. Dorsey, 379 U.S. 433 (1965).
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permitting agency in its past decisions and a level of intentionality in
the current decision beyond awareness of disparate impacts.254 In
the absence of direct evidence of improper racial motive the courts'
approach should roughly conform to the following chart:
DECISION DEFERENCE EVIDENTIARY DISPARITY
MAKER/ LEVEL 256  BURDEN EVIDENCE
DECISION 255  REQUIRED 257
Agency-Executive/ High High Highly Disparate
Technical Racial Impact
Agency- Intermediate Intermediate Significant Disparate
Executive/Non- Racial Impact
Technical
Elected Board/ High High Highly Disparate
Technical Racial Impact
Elected Board/ High Intermediate Substantially
Non-Technical Disparate Racial
Impact
254. See sources cited supra note 151.
255. See Mark D. Rosen, The Surprisingly Strong Case For Tailoring Constitu-
tional Principles, 153 U. PA. L. REv 1513 (2005) (discussing the theoretical basis
for tailoring constitutional principles to different levels of government). See also
Norman R. Williams, Rising Above Factionalism, 69 N.Y.U. L. REv. 963 (1994)
(contending that the Court should consider both the governmental agent making
decisions and the procedure it followed during its judicial review). Technical
decisions under this approach represent those based in scientific or technical profi-
ciency beyond the expertise of judges. See Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources
Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 865 (1984).
256. See Sidney A. Shapiro and Richard E. Levy, Heightened Scrutiny of the
Fourth Branch, 1987 DUKE L. J. 387 (1987) (arguing that the separation of powers
doctrine underlying court deference to agency actions also places a check on ad-
ministrative conduct).
257. This column presumes the use of indirect evidence of racial motive con-
templated by the Court in Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp.,
429 U.S. 252, 255 (1977) in conjunction with statistical data. Under this approach,
the significance of racially disparate impacts is weighted along with other evi-
dence of racial discrimination in assessing an alleged equal protection violation.
See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 241-242 (1976) (discussing the use of
statistical data to ascertain a discriminatory purpose under the Equal Protection
Clause).
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Agency Officer/ Intermediate Intermediate Significant Disparate
Technical Racial Impact
Agency Officer/ Low Low Significant Disparate
Non-Technical Racial Impact or
Highly Disparate
Racial Impact Alone
The highest evidentiary burden will be seen in the decisions of
elected boards and executive level agency directors making technical
decisions. These decisions require the greatest deference to in order
to protect the democratic process that responds to the policy choices
of elected officials. In order to prevail in such cases, claims relying
on circumstantial evidence have a high bar that requires a highly
disparate racial impact in addition to evidence of an improper racial
motive. This high burden is required to overcome courts' reluctance
to interfere in the decisions of elected officials without direct evi-
dence of an impermissible racial motive characteristic of the dejure
legislation of the pre-civil rights era and the affirmative action pro-
grams of the last three decades. In the absence of direct evidence, a
combination of a high level of racial disparity and additional evi-
dence from which the court can readily infer a discriminatory pur-
poseful should meet the courts demands.
Elected boards making non-technical decisions make up a unique
class of decisions. In these cases, a high level of deference ought to
be provided the elected bodies absent direct evidence of racial mo-
tive, however, because the decision is non-technical fewer institu-
tional competency concerns constrain the courts. Boards issuing
decisions based in technical criteria warrant more restraint from
courts than others. This distinction is reflected in a distinct eviden-
tiary burden in these cases that requires that a substantial racial dis-
parity be shown together with evidence of a racial motive. By re-
quiring a substantial disparity along with racial motive evidence, this
intermediate burden falls between the lowest and highest evidentiary
requirements reflecting an appropriate deference to elected officials
policy judgments when presented with fewer institutional compe-
tency concerns.
Executive level agency directors making non-technical decisions
and non-executive level agency officials making technical decisions
make up the next level which merits an intermediate level eviden-
tiary burden. In each of these cases, claims relying on circumstantial
evidence will require a significant disparate racial impact plus evi-
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dence of an improper racial motive. Although the evidentiary bur-
den and the deference provided by the court are the same for both of
these cases, the rationale differs. Executive level agency directors
making non-technical environmental decisions warrant less defer-
ence from the courts based on the non-technical nature of their con-
siderations and the courts ability to evaluate the grounds of the chal-
lenged decision. In turn, a lower evidentiary burden is called for to
infer a discriminatory purpose. When a non-executive agency offi-
cer renders a decision based on technical criteria the court should
also apply an intermediate level of deference based on the technical
nature of the officer's decision and the institutional competencies it
reflects; in these cases an intermediate evidentiary burden will re-
quire that a significant racial disparity be shown in addition to racial
motive evidence.
The lowest level of deference and the lowest evidentiary burden
coincide when non-elected agency officers make non-technical deci-
sions. These judgments raise the fewest institutional competence
concerns as a result of their non-technical nature and warrant the
least amount of deference from the courts based on the non-elected
and non-executive position of the decision maker. These matters
call for the greatest inquiry by the courts and the highest sensitivity
to the racial disparity of decisions. At this level, an inference of dis-
criminatory purpose can be raised by significant disparate racial im-
pacts together with racial motive evidence and in some cases highly
disparate racial impacts alone. By recognizing the different levels of
evidence required and deference warranted courts gives meaningful
expression to both democratic process concerns and institutional
competencies while continuing to examine executive and legislative
branch decisions for the taint of invidious racial discrimination that
offend our constitutional protections.
This foregoing theoretical analysis of the Court's Equal Protection
Jurisprudence conforms to the decisions in the environmental justice
cases brought under the Equal Protection Clause discussed above. 258
In Bean, the court eviscerated the claimants' disparity claim by dis-
tinguishing the actions of the Texas Department of Health and the
Texas Department of Water Resources. While the claimant al-
leged that the TDH had continued the historic discriminatory pattern
258. See supra text accompanying notes 52-96.
259. See Bean v. Sw. Waste Mgmt. Corp., 482 F. Supp. 673, 677-79 (Tex.
1979).
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of the TDWR, the court maintained that as distinct agencies their
actions should not be considered together.260 This distinction plays
out in similar ways in the other cases as well.261 The Court in East
Bibb began its analysis, like the court in Bean, removing the landfills
placed in black communities by another body from the disparity
analysis.2 62 After doing so, the court found that no significant dis-
parity existed.263 In R.LS.E. v. Kaye, the Court rejected evidence
that all but one of the landfills placed in the county were located in
black communities partially on the grounds that only two commis-
sioners who approved only one of the three other landfills currently
served on the commission. 264  This approach falls squarely within
the "perpetrator's perspective." 26 5  Courts, when evaluating dis-
criminatory effects, consider the actions of only one agency instead
of the cumulative effect of multiple agencies. 66
Environmental justice decisions can also be explained under de-
mocratic process and motive review theory. 267  Under those theo-
ries, courts will defer to the judgment of legislative bodies and high-
level executive officers to exercise judicial restraint to protect de-
mocratic values.268 The environmental cases above reflect the deci-
sions of state administrative officers or county commissioners.269
Motive review theory counsels distinct approaches under each of
these two governmental bodies. 27  For the administrative decision
maker, the issuance of a permit follows a highly regulated technical
review process. 271 Generally, permitting authorities grant environ-
mental permit requests unless applicants fail to satisfy pre-
260. Id.
261. E. Bibb Twiggs Neighborhood Ass'n. v. Macon-Bibb County Planning &
Zoning Comm'n, 706 F. Supp. 880 (M.D. Ga. 1989), aff'd., 896 F.2d 1264 (11th
Cir. 1989).
262. Id. at 1266.
263. Id. at 1267.
264. R.I.S.E. v. Kay, Inc., 786 F. Supp. 1144, 1149-50 (E.D. Va. 1991).
265. See Freeman, supra note 163.
266. Alan Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination through Antidiscrimi-
nation Law: A Critical Review of Supreme Court Doctrine, 62 MINN. L. REV.
1049, 1054 (1978).
267. Foster, Intent and Incoherence, supra note 155 at 1100-02.
268. Id.
269. See supra notes 52-151 and accompanying text.
270. See supra text accompanying notes 52-151.
271. ABA, THE LAW OF ENVTL. JUSTICE: THEORIES & PROCEDURES TO
ADDRESS DISPROPORTIONATE RISKS 473-81 (Michael B. Gerrard ed., NYU Press
2001) (1999).
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established federal or state criteria. 2 72 Unless these criteria include
community input or "environmental justice" as considerations,
agency decision makers typically express the view that they lack the
authority to deny a permit if it otherwise complies with state and
federal technical requirements.
273
Courts reviewing these permitting decisions under an equal protec-
tion analysis will defer to the technical judgments of agency authori-
ties absent evidence of a specific discriminatory intent. Under
motive review theory, these decisions can warrant a high level of
deference. 275 The particular institutional competencies involved and
the limited discretion of the decision makers, for some executive
decisions, call for courts to use "super restraint" since neither politi-
cal nor fundamental rights are involved.276 Exercising this high
level of restraint, courts will not overturn the decisions of a high-
level administrator unless presented with evidence of a specific in-
tent to discriminate.277 Administrative agencies' decisions to grant
permits, despite discriminatory effects rather than due to them ac-
cordingly, fail to demonstrate the requisite intent.
278
In South Camden Citizens in Action v. N.J. Department. of Envi-
ronmental Protection,, the District Court denied plaintiffs' claim that
the NJDEP violated § 1983 by granting a pollution permit to a ce-
ment processing facility in a minority community already burdened
with multiple polluting facilities without assessing the disparate ra-
cial impacts it would cause. 279 The District Court held that plaintiffs
failed to show that the agency granted the permit because of rather
than in spite of the disparate racial effects. 28 In essence, the court
found no specific intention to discriminate by the department and
272. See Cole & Foster, supra note 65, at 103-21 (for a discussion of the role of
the opportunities and limits of public participation within the environmental deci-
sion-making context).
273. Id. at 75-76. Consider the position adopted by the Michigan Department of
Environmental Quality in NAACP-Flint County Chapter v. Engler, Genesee
County Cir. Ct., 95-38228-CV.
274. Foster, Intent andIncoherence, supra note 155.
275. Id. at 1122-28.
276. Id.
277. Id.
278. S. Camden Citizens in Action v. N.J. Dep't. of Envtl. Prot., 274 F.3d 771,
775 (2001); see also supra note 151.
279. S. Camden Citizens in Action, 274 F.3d at 775.
280. See supra note 151.
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absent such a finding saw no basis to hold that the agency violated §
1983.
Quasi-legislative bodies with discretion to approve or deny local
land use decisions lack the restrictions placed upon administrative
agencies. 28' These voting bodies can weigh a host of considerations
in their decision-making. 282 Under Motive Review Theory, the in-
creased discretion these bodies enjoy; warrants a decreased level of
deference from courts in light of the increased opportunity for im-
proper considerations to affect members' judgment.283  However,
those bodies making local land use decisions will likely receive
greater deference from courts in light of democratic process con-
cers and courts' preference that local elected officials make deci-
sions about local land use.284 Court decisions in these cases then will
continue to reflect the "super restraint" shown to technical adminis-
trative agency decisions only finding racial discrimination when
provided with evidence of "specific intent" by the decision making
body.285
In Rise v. Kaye, the county commission's decision to grant a per-
mit request for an additional landfill in a black neighborhood despite
the exclusive location of the county's three other operating landfills
in black communities received great deference from the court. At-
tributing little significance to the disparate impact of the decision,
the court found that the commission's motivation was the economic
well being of the entire county and not the race of the community
where the facility would be located.286 Consistent with motive re-
view theory, the court looked to the decision of the commission with
substantial deference to their stated rationale for the land use deci-
sion.287  Without evidence that a specific intent to discriminate
281. See generally Cole and Foster, supra note 65.
282. See R.I.S.E. v. Kay, Inc., 786 F. Supp. 1144, 1150 (E.D. Va. 1991) (noting
the number of factors considered by the Board including the economic environ-
mental and cultural needs of the country); E. Bibb Twiggs Neighborhood Ass'n. v.
Macon-Bibb County Planning & Zoning Comm'n, 706 F. Supp. 880, 882-84
(M.D. Ga. 1989), affd., 896 F.2d 1264 (11th Cir. 1989) (outlining the broad range
of considerations in the Board's decision making process), and Foster, Intent and
Incoherence, supra note 155 (discussing the significance of legislative versus ad-
ministrative decision making bodies under the democratic process theory).
283. See Foster, Intent andIncoherence, supra note 155 at 1065, 1132-34.
284. Id. at 1102-03.
285. Id. at 1122.
286. Id. at 1150.
287. Id.
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guided the commissioners, the court gave little consideration to
claimant's allegations of racial bias.
288
In each of the aforementioned court decisions plaintiffs alleged a
disparate racial impact of the decision, specifically that one or more
minority groups residing nearby suffered a disparate effect of the
requested pollution permit.28 9 The analytical model of ethnic com-
petition provides significant insight into contemporary views of the
federal courts regarding racial disparities related to the social and
economic market place.290 Absent evidence that government actors
purposefully intended to discriminate against parties because of their
race, the disproportionate effects of government decisions on par-
ticular racial groups that otherwise reflect market based choices and
competition will only rarely implicate a violation of the Equal Pro-
tection Clause.291 This has broad ranging implications for environ-
mental justice advocates, activists, and would be litigants. 292  The
Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution, Title VI of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and § 1983 of the United States Code
offer protection against mere racial disparity in pollution exposure,
facility siting, or the negative effects of federal or state pollution
permits in only a small category of cases with highly disparate racial
impacts.293 Further, it is extremely unlikely that the EPA's regula-
tions proscribing such disparities will be used to invalidate a state
permit decision absent overwhelming evidence that permitting offi-
cials acted in bad faith in making a permit decision.294 Racial dis-
parity based on de facto residential segregation patterns will rarely if
288. Id. at 1149-50.
289. See Foster, Intent and Incoherence, supra note 155 at 1065.
290. See Lindsay, How Antidiscrimination Law Learned to Live with Racial
Inequality, supra note 210.
291. Certain decisions are relegated to the markets, not to the courts. See Lind-
say, How Antidiscrimination Law Learned to Live with Racial Inequality, supra
note 210, at 115. , and Foster, Intent andIncoherence, supra note 155 at 1110.
292. See supra notes 214-250 and accompanying text.
293. See Sean-Patrick Wilson, Fighting the Good Fight: The Role of Envtl.
Civil Rights Litigators Going Forward and the Need for a Continuance of the
Litigation Tool in the Envtl. Justice Movement, 28 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 293
(2006); Uma Outka, Envtl. Justice and the Problem of the Law, 57 ME. L. REV.
209 (2005), and Kyle W. La Londe, Who Wants to be an Envtl. Justice Advocate?:
Options for Bringing an Envtl. Justice Complaint in the Wake of Alexander v.
Sandoval, 31 B.C. ENvTL. AFF. L. REV. 27 (2004).
294. See generally Michael Zywicki, Scalia Envtl. Justice Movement,
www.vjel.org/editorials/pdf/ED10033.pdf. (to date, the EPA has never invalidated
a state permitting decision based on its Title VI regulation).
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ever lead to civil rights violations under the courts contemporary
analysis that accepts racial disparity as an expression of the prefer-
ences, values, and abilities of the diverse racial and ethnic groups
that make up American society. 295 From this perspective, perceived
environmental injustices reflect the function of the market place and
not the racial biases of local, state, or federal officials responsible for
making environmental decisions.296 Successful cases based on dis-
parity alone will require evidence of highly disparate racial impacts
that lack an environmental justification.
Under the "perpetrator's perspective," disparities in alleged pollu-
tion exposure constitute unfortunate circumstances, but responsibil-
ity should not be placed on the "innocent" government or commer-
cial actors who will routinely act without racial animus or discrimi-
natory intent. 297 Using motive review theory, it appears that only
two small categories of environmental decisions will typically vio-
late the Equal Protection Clause as the institutional competencies
and the democratic process preferences call for deference by courts
that lead to a high evidentiary burden for litigants to prove decision
makers acted with racially discriminatory motives.298 Non-technical
decisions made by elected bodies that include evidence of racial mo-
tive and a substantial disparate racial impact and non-technical deci-
sions made by lower level agency officials that include evidence of
racial motive and a significant disparate impact or highly disparate
impact alone require the lowest level of deference and the least evi-
dentiary burden. In these cases, courts ought to afford less deference
and conduct a more searching review of the decisions rendered. Evi-
dence of racial motive and statistically significant disparity should
lead to a searching examination of the proffered explanation of
agency officials.
Likewise, highly disparate impacts of non-technical decisions
made by agency officials warrant a searching review even without
evidence of racial motive. To afford the same level of deference to
295. See Lindsay, How Antidiscrimination Law Learned to Live with Racial
Inequality, supra note 210, at 87.
296. See Vicki Been, What's Fairness Got to Do With It? Envtl. Justice and the
Siting of Locally Undesirable Land Uses, 78 CORNELL L. REv. 1001 (1993); see
also Vicki Been & Francis Gupta, Coming to the Nuisance or Moving to the Bar-
rios? A Longitudinal Analysis of Envtl. Justice Claims, 24 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1
(1997) (for a discussion of the limitations of market-based decision making).
297. See Freeman, supra note 163, at 1049.
298. See infra notes 303-305 and accompanying text.
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the non-technical decisions of unelected officials as that provided the
technical decisions of elected officials would not represent a protec-
tion of the democratic process but a relinquishment of the courts re-
sponsibility to see that laws are faithfully executed in accordance
with the constitutional constraints of the Equal Protection Clause.
Of course, direct evidence of racial animus by a decision maker of
the type associated with the Jim Crow South should end the defer-
ence afforded by courts on technical and political grounds and re-
quire a searching review of any environmental decision.
The judge's statement quoted above in South Camden Citizens in
Action captures society's current view toward racial minorities' alle-
gations of discrimination today-unless you can show that the chal-
lenged actions resulted from overt racial animus, the perceived in-
fringement warrants neither moral nor legal sanction. Along with
the jurisprudential analysis above, a historical analysis of the civil
rights movement at its close clarifies the courts' rejection of envi-
ronmental justice claims based in civil rights legal theories.299
V. CROSSING HELL'S BASEMENT - RACIAL ALIENATION WITHOUT
RACIAL AmMUS
In most respects, the de facto segregation in housing and public
education experienced by African Americans today is no different
than it was on Chicago's Westside in 1966 during SCLC's cam-
paign.300 Four decades later, segregation in housing and education
remain as fixed reminders that civil rights laws were embraced as a
popular means to eliminate the overt dejure segregation of the South
but not the covert defacto segregation of the North. More than any
other racial group, blacks today experience the highest level of racial
segregation in housing and education. 30 1 In a follow-up to the Ker-
ner Report, the Eisenhower Foundation found that forty years after
the original Kemer Report 63% of African-Americans attended ra-
299. See discussion infra notes 298-314 and accompanying text.
300. At the close of the Chicago campaign the lead local organizer who had
implored Dr. King to come and offer assistance was distressed by the fact that
"there may never be an answer" for the type of discrimination that they faced.
Oates, supra note 3, at 418.
301. See Freeman, supra note 163, at 1057; Orfield, G. and Lee, C., Racial
Transformation and the Changing Nature of Segregation. Cambridge, MA: The
Civil Rights Project at Harvard University 4, 9, 18 (2006), available at
http://www.civilrightsproject.ucla.edu/research/deseg/Racial-Transformation.pdf.
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cially segregated schools compared with 67% in 1968.302 In hous-
ing, African Americans remain the most segregated members of
American society despite modest gains over the past twenty years.
303
Despite these and other factors reinforcing the tenuous condition of
black communities across the United States from 1968 up to the pre-
sent, claims that racial bias influences environmental decision-
making have been consistently rejected.30 4
In the cases considered above, the predominantly African-
American communities in Flint, Houston, Macon, Danville, and
South Camden were victims of significant residential segregation
that resulted from a combination of private and public racially influ-
enced decisions before and at the time the suits were brought.305 On
top of the residential segregation they experienced, these communi-
ties also suffered the adversity caused by multiple pollution sources
near and in their communities. 306 In an effort to gain relief, commu-
nity members turned to the courts in the hopes of gaining the protec-
tion of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
and Title VI of the Civil Rights Act. 307 Time after time and case
after case, however, federal courts could find no racial animus or
racial opprobrium and therefore no violation of the residents' rights
by public officials. 30 8 This phenomenon reflects the long term fail-
302. DAWAYNE WICKHAM & TUKUFU ZUBERI, KERNER PLUS 40 REPORT,
available at http://www.ifajs.org/events/spring08/Kerner40/Report.pdf (last visited
Feb. 27, 2009).
303. JOHN ICELAND ET AL., U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, SERIES CENSR-3, RACIAL
AND ETHNIC RESIDENTIAL SEGREGATION IN THE UNITED STATES: 1980-2000
(U.S. Gov't Printing Office 2002), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/
2002pubs/censr-3.pdf (last visited Feb. 26, 2009).
304. See Freeman, supra note 163, at 1049.
305. See ROBERT D. BULLARD ET AL., RESIDENTIAL APARTHEID: THE
AMERICAN LEGACY 49, 57, 62-63, 74-75 (CAAS Publications 1994), exploring the
contemporary dominance of de facto segregation in American residential patterns.
Bullard describes and explains the phenomenon that segregates Latinos and hyper-
segregates African Americans; see generally ROBERT D. BULLARD ET AL.,
HIGHWAY ROBBERY: TRANSPORTATION RACISM AND NEW ROUTES TO EQUITY
(South End Press 2004) (discussing publicly funded segregation); JOE R. FEAGIN
& KARYN D. MCKINNEY, THE MANY COSTS OF RACISM 335-36 (Rowman & Lit-
tlefield Publishers, Inc. 2005).
306. CLIFFORD RECHTSCHAFFEN & EILEEN GAUNA, ENVTL. JUSTICE LAW,
POLICY & REGULATION 334-349 (Carolina Academic Press 2002); Peter L. Reich,
Greening the Ghetto: A Theory of Envtl. Race Discrimination, 41 U. KAN. L. REv.
271, 291-95,299, 301-02, 305, 311-2 (1992).
307. See Freeman, supra note 163, at 1057.
308. Id.
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ure of civil rights law to address a historic form of racial discrimina-
tion perpetuated through facially neutral policies. From the close of
the SCLC's Chicago Campaign to the present, the de facto segrega-
tion of American cities remains substantially intact.30 9 Moreover,
contrary to prevailing notions that blacks have moved into the mid-
dle class and rendered racial discrimination concerns irrelevant, re-
search indicates the contrary. In education and economic advance-
ment, most black "middle class" children attend racially segregated
schools along with low-income blacks. 310 In economic terms, sixty-
nine percent (69%) of black children from the middle class fail to
exceed their parents' income in contrast with sixty-eight percent of
whites (68%) from the middle class who surpass their parents' in-
come. 311 These statistics, along with many others, reflect the soci-
ety's continued failure to respond meaningfully to the discrimination
concerns raised by Dr. King before his death and the Kemer Com-
mission in their decisive report.312 Despite the regular proof of con-
tinuing racial discrimination against blacks and other racial minori-
ties in American society, in housing, employment, and other areas,
race-based civil rights law remains at the fringes of political and le-
gal action with the exception of reverse discrimination claims
against parties seeking to remedy past discrimination. 313 The society
and the courts' sanction of discrimination, couched in facially neu-
tral policies that hide ongoing conscious and unconscious racial bi-
309. See supra text accompanying notes 149-51; see also MARY PATILLO-
McCoy, BLACK PICKET FENCES 30 (Univ. of Chicago Press 1999) for considera-
tion of the tenuous nature of black "middle class" life in northern cities.
310. See sources cited supra note 306.
311. DEWAYNE WICKHAM, et al., KERNER PLus 40 REPORT (2008),
http://www.ifajs.org/events/spring08/Kerner40/Report.pdf.
312. The Kerner Report was rejected by then President Lyndon B. Johnson. Id.
at 78, 85.
313. Civil rights enforcement has continually declined over the past decades
despite numerous studies showing continued racial discrimination and rather con-
sistent complaint levels. Reverse discrimination claims in contrast have occupied
increasing legislative, judicial, and executive attention over the last twenty years.
Consider Grutter v. Bollinger, 309 F.3d 329 (6th Cir. 2001); Gratz v. Bollinger,
188 F.3d 394 (6th Cir. 1999); Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle
School Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738 (2007). Also note that Florida, California,
Michigan, and Washington have passed ballot initiatives proscribing affirmative
action and Arizona, Colorado and Nebraska are poised to vote on this issue in
2008.
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ases and prejudices, precludes civil rights based attacks on environ-
mental injustices. 314
As the survey above indicates, civil rights laws have proven inef-
fective for communities claiming environmental injustice. 315 This
ineffectiveness reflects the stagnation of the society's interest in
eliminating the type of racism that the Kerner Commission found
316caused urban riots in the middle to late 1960s. Because environ-
mental injustice claims typically correspond to the covert racial bias
associated with the American North of the late 1960s rather than the
overt racial discrimination of the Jim Crow South, the nation's anti-
discrimination law serves as an ineffective weapon to challenge the
disparate racial effects of environmental decisions. However, before
abandoning hope altogether, environmental justice claimants may
consider the Environmental Justice Act of 2007 recently under con-
sideration in the United States Congress as a backdoor out of the
inferno they have faced. Much like Dante's ultimate escape from
Hell, environmental justice claimants may find that they have de-
scended so low in their legal journey that the only direction left to go
is up.
VI. UP FROM THE INFERNO - LEGISLATIVE LIGHT IN DARK PLACES
On February 15, 2007, Congressional representative Hilda Solis
from California's 32nd Congressional District introduced H.R. 1103
- Environmental Justice Act of 2007. 3' 7 On the same day, United
States Senator Richard Durbin introduced S.642 - identical compan-
314. Consider Adrian G. Carpusor & William E. Loges, Rental Discrimination
and Ethnicity in Names, 36 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 934, 934-952 (2006) (find-
ing that housing owners provided a positive response to inquiries from rental ap-
plicants with names identified with African-Americans at a 56% rate compared
with a 89% rate for names identified with whites); see also Marianne Bertrand &
Sendhil Mullainathan, Are Emily and Greg More Employable Than Lakisha and
Jamal? A Field Experiment on Labor Market Discrimination (NAT'L BUREAU OF
ECON. RESEARCH, Working Paper No. 9873, 2003), available at
http://www.nber.org/papers/w9873.
315. See supra Part II.
316. REPORT OF THE NAT'L ADVISORY COMM'N ON CiviL DISORDERS 609 (Ban-
tam Books 1968), available at
http://www.eisenhowerfoundation.org/docs/Kerner.pdf.; KERNER PLUS 40
REPORT, http://www.ifaj s.org/events/spring08/Kerner4O/Report.pdf.
317. Envtl. Justice Act of 2007, S. 642, 110th Cong. (2007-2008) (a bill to cod-
ify Exec. Order 12898).
106 FORDHAMENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW
ion legislation in the Senate. 318 These bills attempt to enshrine the
federal mandate penned by President William Jefferson Clinton in
Executive Order 12898 on Environmental Justice into federal law. 319
While it is beyond the scope of this article to undertake a compre-
hensive evaluation of the proposed legislation, this section briefly
raises some critical concerns regarding the proposed act. A more
detailed examination of the role of federal agencies in addressing
environmental justice concerns and the legal authorities to do so is
contemplated for further research. The section begins by examining
the existing executive order and its implementation by federal agen-
cies; a consideration of some prominent limitations and likely chal-
lenges under the proposed act follows.
The core component of the Executive Order directs federal agen-
cies to "identify and address... disproportionately high and adverse
human health or environmental effects of its programs, policies, and
activities on minority populations and low-income populations." 320
In addition, the Executive Order directs agencies to develop Envi-
ronmental Justice strategies that list the "programs, policies, plan-
ning and public participation processes, enforcement, and/or rule-
makings related to human health or the environment that should be
revised" pursuant to the dictates of the order.321 Further, the Order
maintains the following:
Each Federal agency shall conduct its programs, policies,
and activities that substantially affect human health or the
environment, in a manner that ensures that such pro-
grams, policies, and activities do not have the effect of
excluding persons (including populations) from participa-
tion in, denying persons (including populations) the bene-
fits of, or subjecting persons (including populations) to
discrimination under, such programs, policies, and activi-
ties, because of their race, color, or national origin.
322
318. Id.
319. As officially titled "A bill to codify Exec. Order 12898, relating to envi-
ronmental justice, to require the Administrator of the Envtl. Prot. Agency to fully
implement the recommendations of the Inspector General of the Agency and the
Comptroller General of the United States, and for other purposes." Id.
320. Exec. Order No. 12898, 3 C.F.R. 859 (1994) reprinted as amended in 42
U.S.C. § 4321 (2001).
321. Id.
322. Id.
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The preceding three provisions along with the requirement that
agencies "collect, maintain, and analyze information assessing and
comparing environmental and human health risks borne by popula-
tions identified by race, national origin, or income" form the bulk of
the substantive obligations of the Order.32 3 As drafted, these four
provisions held considerable potential for addressing long and short
term concerns of environmental justice claimants and advocates.
Independently, each of these provisions could have significantly
changed the long or short-term experience of environmental injustice
faced by minority and low-income communities. Together, these
provisions should have radically transformed the way that both low
income and minority communities understood, related to, and were
impacted by local pollutions sources. From the EPA's far-reaching
pollution permitting programs to the Department of Transportation's
ubiquitous projects, the primary pollution sources affecting African
American and other communities fall under some federal pro-
324gram. Accordingly, after fourteen years, agencies should be well
on their way to the resolution of a great number of environmental
injustices.
Sadly, agencies have achieved an uneven record, at best, toward
the directives of the Executive Order.325 The agency with the most
significant environmental responsibility, the EPA, has been cited
repeatedly for its failure to follow the directives of the Executive
Order.32 6 Instead of the systematic program analysis approach out-
lined by the Executive Order, the EPA has conducted an inconsistent
environmental justice program that readily raised public awareness,
participated in crisis management, and improved community rela-
tions but failed to systematically implement the directives of the Ex-
323. Id.
324. Steven A. Light & Kathryn R.L. Rand, Is Title VIA Magic Bullet? Envtl.
Racism in the Context of Political-Economic Processes and Imperatives, 2 MICH.
J. RACE& L. 1, 8, 44 (1996-1997).
325. Denis Binder, et al., A Survey of Fed. Agency Response to President Clin-
ton's Executive Order No. 12898 on Envtl. Justice, 31 ENVTL. L. REP. 11133,
11149-50 (2001). See also, Meredith Judge Bowers, The Executive's Response to
Envtl. Injustice: Executive Order 12,898, 1 ENVTL. LAW 645, 656 (1995).
326. OFFICE OF INSPECTOI GEN., EPA NEEDS TO CONSISTENTLY IMPLEMENT
THE INTENT OF THE EXECUTIVE ORDER ON ENVTL. JUSTICE, REPORT No. 2004-P-
00007 ii 7 (2004); U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, EPA SHOULD DEVOTE
MORE ATrENTION TO ENVTL. JUSTICE WHEN DEVELOPING CLEAN AIR RULES 3
(2005).
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ecutive Order. 327 While many of these failures reflect the limited
support in Congress and the White House for substantive changes to
the agency's approach to fulfilling its substantive statutory obliga-
tions, high-level agency management had differing views about the
role and standing of the program over the years.328 Some agencies
have fared better in implementing the Executive Order, and others
have fared worse. 329 As a general matter, the limited success of
some agencies in implementing the Executive Order appears to flow
from the relative unimportance that agency executive's assigned Ex-
ecutive Order implementation.
330
The codification of the Executive Order provides an affirmation
from Congress that federal agency programs that spawn dispropor-
tionately high and adverse human health or environmental effects
have a legal obligation to identify and address them. 33 1 This codifi-
cation speaks directly to the past neglect of environmental injustices
caused or perpetuated by agency programs by elevating the obliga-
tion above "agency management directives" to statutory responsibili-
ties. 332 As statutory dictates, the above-stated provisions warrant
increased prioritization, funding, and implementation criteria rather
than a secondary responsibility that regulators jettison or disregard
when addressing primary commitments. Environmental justice obli-
gations command heightened emphasis and attention under the pro-
posed legislation as legally enforceable responsibilities.333 How-
ever, the elevated status offered by the Executive Order should be
seen as a minimal and moderate step by Congress to address this
issue. The proposed legislation introduces no new substantive obli-
gations to federal agencies, instead requiring that agencies give more
weight to the obligations contained in the existing Executive Or-
der. Furthermore, the statute neither redefines nor restructures the
327. See supra note 323.
328. Id.
329. See A Survey of Federal Agency Response to President Clinton's Execu-
tive Order No. 12898 on Environmental Justice, XXXI Environmental Law Re-
porter 11133 (October 2001) (with Denis Binder, Colin Crawford, Eileen Gauna,
M. Casey Jarman, Bradford C. Mank, Catherine O'Neill, Clifford Rechtschaffen,
and Robert R. M. Verchick).
330. Id.
331. Exec. Order No. 12,898, 3 C.F.R. 859 (1994) reprinted as amended in 42
U.S.C. § 4321 (2001).
332. Id. at § 6-609.
333. See Envtl. Justice Act, supra note 314.
334. Id.
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requirements of the Executive Order. This allows agencies to
strengthen and expand existing programming as necessary to comply
with the codified obligations rather than creating a brand new set of
commitments. 335In some cases, this may lead to an elevated status
for existing programs and greater attention to the dictates of the cur-
rent Executive Order. Without more specific legislative direction,
however, it may result in few if any changes to some agencies' ap-
proach to the issue rather than the elevation of the issue that the pro-
posed Act appears to intend.
More specifically, , as drafted, the Act retains a significant ambi-
guity that was present in the Executive Order; in the principle direc-
tive that requires agencies to "address" the environmental injustices
they "identify" without specifying how they are to do so. To be
more effective the proposed legislation should provide agencies with
greater direction regarding how they should address "disproportion-
ately high and adverse" effects. While administrative law principles
dictate that each federal agency interpret this ambiguity through
regulation and rulemaking such a gaping ambiguity potentially raises
non-delegation concerns.
3 6
In the absence of greater detail in a final version of the Act, agen-
cies should re-evaluate their environmental justice strategies in
light of the legal elevation of the requirements. In conjunction with
the Department of Justice, agency General Counsel's should perform
an analysis of the legal authorities currently available to implement
the Act along with the necessary regulatory changes required to ful-
fill the new Congressional mandate. The EPA Office of General
Counsel orchestrated such an analysis following the issuance of the
Executive Order. The analysis detailed agency legal authority to
provide a robust implementation of the Executive Order including
regulatory and rulemaking changes. However, agency management
subsequently decided that the all but complete analysis be scuttled,
the process abandoned, and discussions ceased.337  The proposed
335. Id.
336. 3 KENNETH CULP DAVIS & RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
TREATISE § 1.7 (Little, Brown & Company 1994); see also Chevron USA v. Natu-
ral Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
337. As a member of an agency-wide working group on environmental justice,
the author worked along with other lawyers across the agency to ascertain the legal
authorities available to implement the Order. The robust analysis identified scores
of existing legal authorities and appropriate regulatory actions to implement the
Order. The agencies decision to abandon this effort undercut the authority and
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legislation should engender a similar process across the covered
agencies that would meaningfully integrate environmental justice
into the legal framework of agencies' administrative regimes. Provi-
sion 6-608 in conjunction with the language of 1-10 1 seemingly con-
templates no less in stating that agencies shall implement the man-
date "to the extent permitted by existing law." 338 As a minimal and
moderate step, however, the Act may leave a vast expanse of
claimed environmental injustices untouched unless agencies reinter-
pret their obligations in light of the heightened legal bona fides of
the Executive Order's provisions created by the Act.339 If agencies
move forward with regulatory development of the area, the adminis-
trative law process may resolve some of these issues, however, a
business as usual approach will offer communities little hope of
meaningful change.3
One critical part of the re-evaluation that EPA, specifically, should
undergo must be to its Title VI program. Because the proposed leg-
islation fails to address the Supreme Court's denial of private rights
of action under Title VI, claimants only recourse for redressing dis-
parate racial impacts from federal grant recipient programs rest with
the EPA's Office of Civil Rights. Due to its small staff and limited
budget, the thorough investigation of complaints often precedes at a
glacial pace. 341 Under the proposed legislation, the EPA and other
status of the program despite attestations by EPA management that environmental
justice was an agency priority.
338. § 1-101 states, "To the greatest extent practicable and permitted by law,
and consistent with the principles set forth in the report on the National Perform-
ance Review, each Federal agency shall make achieving environmental justice part
of its mission..." Exec. Order No. 12,898, 3 C.F.R. 859 (1994) reprinted as
amended in 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (2001).
339. Some persons still debate the existence of environmental injustices as an
actual phenomenon. However, their approach to the question suffers from a fun-
damental flaw. Instead of viewing environmental injustice claims as the discrete
experiences of individuals that warrant consideration, they perceive the matter as a
phenomenon that only exists if universally experienced by a statistical majority of
the nation's minority and low-income populations. While this broad based analy-
sis has value and evinces disturbing racial trends, it cannot determine the legiti-
macy of any single community's claims of environmental injustices. What may
not be a pattern in the Midwest can certainly be a recurring phenomenon in the
Southeast, and what may not be an ongoing phenomenon in the Northeast certainly
can still take place.
340. DAVIS & PIERCE, supra note 333 at § 1.7.
341. See Luke W. Cole & Caroline Farrell, Structural Racism, Structural Pollu-
tion and the Need for a New Paradigm, 20 WASH. U. J. L. & POL'Y 265, 270
(2006).
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federal agencies will be required for the first time to fulfill their Title
VI obligations in light of the agencies' detailed Environmental Jus-
tice Strategy and agency wide program evaluation. Rather than a
stand alone obligation unrelated to their environmental justice re-
sponsibilities, the proposed legislation could prompt agencies to
evaluate and consider Title VI as one of the means of implementing
the proposed legislation "to the greatest extent practicable and per-
mitted by law." 342
One glaring limitation of the legislation is its neglect of the judicial
rejection of environmentally based discrimination cases. It neither
recognizes nor acknowledges the United States Supreme Court's
denial of private rights of action under Title VI in Alexander v.
Sandoval, a matter easily resolved through a simple legislative ex-
pression of intent to allow private citizens to use the discriminatory
effects standard found in agency regulations in their vrivate dis-
crimination suits brought against federal grant recipients. Further,
the proposed legislation offers no civil rights protection against ra-
cial discrimination in environmental decision making by private or
non-funded public entities. Unlike the civil rights legislation passed
by Congress to address the panoply of discrimination issues in the
society,344 the Environmental Justice Act of 2007 takes the modest
step of codifying the fourteen year old executive order that requires
federal agencies to identify and address their role in producing "dis-
proportionately high and adverse" health and environmental effects
on "low income" and "minority populations." 345 To address envi-
ronmental justice concerns effectively comprehensive legislation that
corrects the ambiguities of the existing Executive Order and pro-
vides greater direction to agencies regarding their responsibilities
will have to be passed. While the proposed legislation does elevate
the concerns of the existing Executive Order as a legal matter, it fails
to illuminate what role the federal government will play in address-
ing these concerns as a practical matter.
342. Exec. Order No. 12,898, supra note 317, at § 1-101.
343. This standard, used regularly by many federal circuits prior to the Court's
decision in Alexander v. Sandoval, would allow private citizens to bring discrimi-
nation claims under Title VI against state agencies that receive federal funds and
have methods of administering their environmental programs that have the effect
of discriminating based on race. 40 C.F.R. § 7.35(b).
344. Past civil rights legislation has proscribed race and sex discrimination in
public accommodations, employment, housing, and the use of federal funds.
345. Exec. Order No. 12,898, supra note 317, at § 1-101.
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VII. CONCLUSION
After going through Hell, environmental justice claimants have lit-
tle hope of actually ascending to a point of recognition for their inju-
ries and relief through the use of civil rights tools represented by the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and Title VI
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.346 However, even Dante found a
narrow exit at the base of the Inferno that led the poet and his guide
to the base of Mount Purgatory, the next step in the traveler's jour-
ney toward the Mount of Joy.347 Environmental justice claimants
may likewise find some glimpses of hope in the proposed Environ-
mental Justice Act of 2007. Unlike the Courts' current construction
of relevant civil rights laws that only "purposeful" discrimination
warrants judicial recognition and redress, the proposed legislation
acknowledges the inadequacy of conducting federal programs in a
way that adversely affects minority communities at disproportion-
ately high levels. 348 If passed this legislation may provide those
willing to continue on the narrow and arduous path through the pain-
ful purgatory of agency interpretation and implementation - a daunt-
ing but conceivable, upward path.
To ensure that the concerns of communities overburdened by pol-
lution receive attention, however, Congress needs to act more in-
tently. As a first step, Title VI should be amended to allow a citi-
zen's filing suit to use the disparate impact standard found in the
EPA's administrative regulations. In so doing, Congress will allow
citizens to serve the important role of aiding the EPA in both moni-
toring and maintaining compliance with the established agency regu-
lations. Further legislative action is also required to set health based
limits on the level of pollution discharged in residential communi-
ties. Because current EPA policies examine pollution permit re-
quests on a discrete basis, multiple pollution sources can and do
overwhelm some residential neighborhoods irrespective of the cu-
mulative risk that may exist. Thoughtful congressional action will
be required to protect communities irrespective of race from the po-
tential health threats that can be created by this practice.
Communities would do well to focus their resources on claims
with highly disparate racial impacts resulting from non-technical
346. Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,42 U.S.C. § 2000 (d).
347. ALIGHIERI, supra note 2.
348. Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275 (2001); Washington v. Davis, 426
U.S. 229 (1976).
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decisions made by agency officials. Even without evidence of racial
motive these cases merit a searching review. Likewise, non-
technical decisions made by lower level agency officials that include
evidence of racial motive and a significant disparate impact require
the lowest level of deference and the least evidentiary burden. These
cases may afford communities the relief they seek when brought
before the courts. Otherwise, persons concerned with disproportion-
ate exposure to pollution should resist the temptation to challenge
environmental decisions on civil rights grounds without strong evi-
dence of racial motive or a keen interest in joining other communi-
ties in an exit-less inferno.

